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INTRODUCTION
During the United States' first half-century, sovereign immunity
prohibited virtually all suits against the federal government.' A citi-
zen's only avenue of redress for an injury by the federal government
was to petition Congress to pass a private bill granting relief.2 As the
government grew and became more involved in the life and business
of the country through regulation, taxing, and spending, the rigid
rule of sovereign immunity came under increasing scrutiny.3 Courts
relaxed the rule by allowing private parties to sue federal officials in
federal district court for conduct in derogation of private rights. 4 In-
undated with private bills, Congress soon recognized the need to
weaken sovereign immunity. Beginning with the establishment of
the Court of Claims in 1855, Congress dramatically expanded the
range of conduct for which the United States may be sued.5
1. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) ("The universally re-
ceived opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States
2. See WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS, A HISTORY, PART II:
ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICrION, 1855-1978, at 9 (1978) (describing process of seeking re-
lief in private bill in Congress). The private bill mechanism was notoriously unfair because of
the logistical difficulties both for plaintiffs presenting bills to Congress and for Congress in in-
vestigating bills. "This system permitted fraudulent, exorbitant or unjust claims to be presented
and considered in view of the inability of Congress to give them careful examination. Because
of the difficulty of reaching a proper determination, Congress often found it safer and wiser
not to act at all." Id. (footnote ommitted). The system was described by a legislator of the day
as "a system of unparalleled injustice and wholly discreditable to any civilized nation." See
CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess., app. at 372,491 (1848).
3. Probably the most famous indictment of sovereign immunity came from President
Abraham Lincoln, who declared that "[i]t is as much the duty of the Government to render
prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private
individuals." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., app. at 2 (1862).
4. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 870-71 (1824). Osbom, a
suit against a state official, established the accepted American doctrine of sovereign immunity
both as to states and as to the United States, by holding that sovereign immunity did not apply
where a suit alleged personal and individual wrongdoing.
Today, an action against a federal official is barred if the relief sought would: (1) expend it-
self on the public treasury; (2) interfere with public administration; or (3) restrain the govern-
ment from acting or compel the government to act. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Hal-
derman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984) (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).
5. SeeAct of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612, 612 (establishing Court of Claims,
with jurisdiction over "all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the
United States").
The court originally constituted as the Court of Claims has gone through a number of re-
constitutions and name changes since its founding in 1855. See generally COWEN ET AL., supra
note 2. The Court of Claims initially consisted of three judges, who appointed commissioners
to hear testimony and investigate claims. See id. at 16-17. The court was limited to finding facts
and making recommendations to Congress. See id. at 17-18. In 1863, the court's size and juris-
diction were expanded, and its judgments were made final, with appeal to the Supreme Court.
See id. at 23-25. In 1925, the court was divided into trial and appellate divisions. See id. at 90.
Although the court's validity was accepted, its constitutional status was uncertain. In 1933,
the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Claims was not an Article III court. See Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553,580 (1933). The Supreme Court changed course, though, in 1962,
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The result of this piecemeal erosion of sovereign immunity was a
significant overlap in the jurisdiction of federal district courts to hear
cases against government officials and in the jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims to hear cases against the United States." In many cases,
conduct by a government official was actionable both against him in-
dividually and against the United States as his principal. Predictably,
plaintiffs brought duplicative lawsuits against the official in district
court, and against the United States in the Court of Claims.8
The situation reached a breaking point in the years following the
Civil War. The Captured and Abandoned Property Act of 1863 had
provided for the confiscation of rebel property for use by the United
States during the war.9 Property not used was sold, with the proceeds
supplementing the federal treasury.'° Claimants to seized property
could recover the proceeds of sale through suit in the Court of
Claims upon a showing that the claimant had not given aid to the
Confederacy." Because this showing was difficult to make, many of
these "cotton claimants" 2 brought suit in their local federal district
holding that the Court of Claims was created under Article III, Section 1. See Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557-58 (1962). Congress ended the speculation in 1982, when it recon-
stituted the Court of Claims by establishing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and
the Claims Court. See generally Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No 97-164, 96
Stat. 25.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created as an Article III court originally
made up of the seven judges of the Court of Claims and the five judges of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals. SeeJOHN STEADMAN ET AL., LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
§ 6.101, at 132 (3d ed. 1994). The Claims Court was created as a court of record under Article
I to take over the trial functions of the Court of Claims. See id. The Claims Court was renamed
the Court of Federal Claims in 1992. See Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural
Improvements Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4516.
Decisions by the former Court of Claims are accorded precedential status by both the Fed-
eral Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims. See STEADMAN ET AL., supra, at 162. Court of
Claims decisions were reported in both the Federal Supplement and the Federal Reporter, as
well as in the Court of Claims Reporter, designated "Ct. Cl." Decisions of the Claims Court
were reported in the Claims Court Reporter, designated "Cl. Ct.," and sometimes in the Fed-
eral Supplement. Current decisions of the Court of Federal Claims are reported in the Federal
Claims Reporter, which is designated "Fed. Cl." and which simply continued in sequence with
the Claims Court Reporter, and sometimes in the Federal Supplement.
6. See generally Brian R. Levey, Tortious Government Conduct and the Government Contract:
Tort, Breach of Contract, or Both?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1992) (examiningjuisdictional overlap
for suits sounding in both contract and tort filed against soveriegn).
7. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 729-32 (1949)
(outlining reported cases involving suits against government officials), superseded by statute as
stated in Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983).
8. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
9. SeeAct of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 120, § 1, 12 Stat. 820, 820 (giving authority to Secretary of
Treasury to appoint agents to collect abandoned or captured property).
10. Seeid.§2,12Stat.at820.
11. See id.
12. See David Schwartz, Section 1500 of theJudicial Code and Duplicate Suits Against the Gov-
ernment and Its Agents, 55 GEO. LJ. 573, 575-77 (1967) (describing situation in which southern
cotton farm owners sued treasury for selling property seized during Civil War).
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courts against the Treasury officers who had seized the property, in
addition to bringing suit in the Court of Claims.'
3
Seeking to avoid the mounting costs of defending the cotton
claims, and demonstrating a general lack of sympathy for the cotton
claimaints, Congress in 1868 passed what is now codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1500.14 The Act prohibited a plaintiff who had a pending claim in a
district court against an officer or agent of the United States from
maintaining an action on the same claim in the Court of Claims
against the United States. 5 The statute, which passed virtually with-
out debate, succeeded in stifling the cotton claimants and in curbing
duplicative suits generally.1 6 But its sledgehammer approach to the
relatively narrow problem it addressed engendered a range of new
problems.
For many years, a wrongfully terminated government employee
could not seek both back pay and reinstatement, because the former
was available only in the Court of Claims, the latter was available only
in a district court, and § 1500 prevented a plaintiff from pursuing
both suits.1 7 Another problem involved government entities with "sue
13. See id. at 576-77 (explaining how, after losing in court of law, cotton claimants would
sue in Court of Claims).
14. The predecessor to § 1500 read:
And be it further enacted, That no person shall file or prosecute any claim or suit in
the court of claims, or an appeal therefrom, for or in respect to which he or any as-
signee of his shall have commenced and has pending any suit or process in any other
court against any officer or person who, at the time of the cause of action alleged in
such suit or process arose, was in respect thereto acting or professing to act, mediately
or immediately, under the authority of the United States, unless such suit or process,
if now pending in such other court, shall be withdrawn or dismissed within thirty days
after the passage of this act.
Act ofJune 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 8, 15 Stat. 75, 77 (repealed 1948).
Upon reading the legislation, one senator stated that its objective was to prevent those who
.put the government to the expense of beating them once in court of law" from suing in the
Court of Claims. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2769 (1868), quoted in Schwartz, supra
note 12, at 576-77.
15. Despite the Act's language limiting its effect to pending suits, the Act apparently was
originally intended to serve as a substitute for ma judicata, preventing the relitigation in the
Court of Claims of issues resolved against the cotton claimants in district court. See Matson
Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352, 355-56 (1932) ("[T]he declared purpose of the
section was only to require an election between a suit in the Court of Claims and one brought
in another court against an agent of the Government, in which the judgment would not be Ma
adjudicata in the suit pending in the Court of Claims.") (internal citations omitted), superseded
by statute as stated in Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 211 n.5 (1993). Resjudicata
would not apply in such a case because of the existence of two different defendants: the Gov-
ernment and the official. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 578 (explaining that section was
promulgated in effort to overcome limited application of res judicata in suits against govern-
ment).
16. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 577 (asserting that in original draft of § 1500, the
amendment to provide for unqualified right to appeal was enacted without subsequent discus-
sion).
17. See id. at 585-86 (discussing problems in suits brought by wrongfully discharged civil
servants). The Court of Claims has never had general equity power. See United States v.Jones,
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and be sued" power. A plaintiff could not sue both an agency and
the United States for a wrong committed by the agency, because only
the United States may be sued in the Court of Claims, and sovereign
immunity prevented the plaintiff from joining the United States in a
suit in district court.' Section 1500 barred the plaintiff from solving
the problem by filing suits in both forums.' 9
Problems such as these were addressed not through revision of
§ 1500, but through the creation of new exceptions to the sovereign
immunity doctrine. The Tucker Act was amended to give the Court
of Claims power to hear reinstatement claims by government em-
ployees.21 The 1976 amendments to the Administrative Procedures
Act! gave district courts jurisdiction over suits for equitable remedies
against the United States.23 In addition, the worst inequities associ-
ated with § 1500 were alleviated by the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1631,
which provided a mechanism for transferring claims between district
courts and the Court of Claims where the plaintiff inadvertently
brought suit in a court withoutjurisdiction over his particular claim.4
Prior to that time, a plaintiff who filed in the wrong court risked be-
ing barred by the statute of limitations from pursuing his remedy in
131 U.S. 1, 19 (1889). Hence, the only avenue to the equitable remedy of reinstatement was
suit in the district court against the head of the employer agency. See Schwartz, supra note 12,
at 586 (noting that head cabinet member was subject to order restoring claimant to position).
The Court of Claims avoided this limitation by holding that § 1500 did not apply where a plain-
tiff sought equitable relief in the district court and money damages in the Court of Claims.
SeeCasman v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956) (finding that Congress could not have in-
tended to force plaintiff to choose between back pay and getting reinstated). Casman is dis-
cussed in detail below.
18. Sae Schwartz, supra note 12, at 581.
19. Sw id.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
21. In 1972, Congress amended the Tucker Act by adding a provision that authorized the
Court of Claims to order a federal official to restore a government employee to a position or
appropriate duty or retirement status. SeeAct of Aug. 29, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-415, § 1, 86 Stat.
652, 652 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (2) (1994)); see also infra notes 63-70 and accompany-
ing text (describing limited equity jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims).
22. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1994)) (abrogating soveriegn immunity of United States by allowing judicial re-
view of federal administrative actions otherwise subject to review).
23. See infra notes 84-134 and accompanying text (describing district court jurisdiction
over United States).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides:
Whenever a civil action is filed [or an appeal noticed] in a court [of the United
States] ... and that court finds that there is a want ofjurisdiction, the court shall, if it
is in the interest ofjustice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in
which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or no-
ticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for
the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or
noticed for the court from which it is transferred.
28 U.S.C. § 1631.
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the proper forum.m
While these scattered remedial efforts made § 1500 easier to live
with, they did not eliminate the arbitrariness of the statute. Section
1500 was, and continues to be, burdened with ambiguity that creates
real-world problems for many litigants.m The central problem is the
statute's undefined use of the term "claim." 27 Courts interpreting the
statute have failed to establish clear criteria for determining when
two suits involve the same claim. Some courts have focused on op-
erative facts,28 others on the relief sought,2m and still others on the le-
gal theories pursued.0 The result is that similarly-situated litigants
are treated differently, sometimes with stark results.31
In recent years, both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
and the United States Supreme Court have addressed the issue of
when § 1500 bars a plaintiff from maintaining simultaneous suits in a
district court and in the Court of Federal Claims. Unfortunately,
these efforts have failed either to relax the requirements of § 1500 or
to establish conclusively a rule of strict construction. This Article ex-
amines the current state of § 1500 in light of these attempts at recon-
struction. Part I presents the basic jurisdictional reach of the Court
of Federal Claims and of the district courts in suits against the United
States and its instrumentalities. Part II analyzes § 1500 and its inter-
pretations in light of recent case law. Part III discusses the problems
25. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 583 (describingjurisdictional impediments for contrac-
tor attempting to sue government corporation).
26. See Payson R. Peabody et al., A Confederate Ghost that Haunts the Federal Courts: The Case
forRepeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1500, 4 FED. CIR. BJ. 95, 102-06 (1994) (discussing problems created by
inconsistent application of§ 1500).
27. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(stating that precise issue is meaning of term "claims").
28. See British Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 438, 441 (1939) (dismissing
case because operative facts in case are same as those in case filed in different court).
29. See Casman v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647, 650 (1956) (permitting case to be heard
in Court of Claims because plaintiff requested money damages while plaintiff's request in dis-
trict court was for equitable relief), overruled by UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013,
1022 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992). In 1992, the court in UNR Industries, Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d
1013, 1022 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992), purported to overrule Casman. When UNR reached the United
States Supreme Court, however, the Court declined to address the correctness of Casman, find-
ing that question outside the scope of the case or controversy. Subsequently, the Federal Cir-
cuit expressly affirmed Casman in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. Baldwin, 27 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
30. See Allied Materials & Equip. Co. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 714, 715-16 (1976)
(denying government's motion to dismiss because § 1500 does not support dismissal of breach
of contract claims even though plaintiff also filed suit based on antitrust law and tort law in dis-
trict court).
31. Compare Wessel, Duval & Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 636, 638 (Ct. Cl. 1954)
(denying request by plaintiff who filed parallel suits based on different theories in Court of
Claims and district court to stay Court of Claims suit pending resolution of jurisdictional is-
sues), with Hossein v. United States, 218 Ct. CL. 727, 729 (1978) (staying suit in Court of Claims
while parallel district court suit was pending on ground that Court of Claims was proper juris-
dictional forum), overruled by UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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inherent in current interpretations of § 1500 and suggests the most
likely judicial responses. The Article concludes that, because a com-
plete revision or repeal is unlikely, the best way to reduce the ineq-
uity and arbitrariness of § 1500 is to grant both district courts and the
Court of Federal Claims limited pendent jurisdiction over suits
against the government that are normally cognizable only in the
other forum.
I. JURISDICTION OVER SUITS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, ITS
AGENCIES, AND OFFICERS
A wide variety of statutes and regulations, as well as the Constitu-
tion itself, waive sovereign immunity to create causes of action against
the federal government.32 In some instances, these laws include aju-
risdictional provision. The majority of suits against the federal gov-
ernment or its instrumentalities, however, arise under a handful of
jurisdictional statutes that allocate jurisdiction to the Court of Fed-
eral Claims or to district courts. These statutes create an overlapping
system of jurisdiction in which the same government conduct may
support a cause of action in either court, but in which different
remedies are available depending on the forum.
A. Jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims
The Court of Federal Claims ("CFC") is the primary forum for suits
against the United States, and the Tucker Act is the most important
mechanism of CFC jurisdiction. The Tucker Act is often thought of
as two separate statutes, and it was codified accordingly. The primary
text of the Tucker Act confers jurisdiction on the CFC. 4 The "Little
Tucker Acte,3 confers concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases on dis-
trict courts.36 The Tucker Act, as amended, provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or
32. See, e.g., U.S. CONSr. amend. V (prohibiting federal government from taking private
property for public use without just compensation); Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1994) (allowing United States to be sued for injunctive relief); Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(a), 1491 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing for suits against United States not sound-
ing in tort); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2678, 2680 (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (providing for tort suits against United States).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a).
34. See id. § 1491(a) (1) (giving CFC jurisdiction over any claim against United States
founded in Constitution, statute or contract).
35. Seeid. § 1346(a)(2).
36. See id. § 1346(a) (1)-(2) (establishing concurrent jurisdiction in district court for cases
involving revenue collection and other cases under the Constitution, statutes, or contracts, and
seeking $10,000 or less).
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any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliq-
uidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
The statute provides for jurisdiction over three substantive areas:
claims founded upon the Constitution, claims founded upon acts of
Congress or regulations, and claims founded upon contracts.m Of
these, the last has been the most important. The Tucker Act makes
the CFC the primary forum for suits against the United States for
breach of contract. Most of these cases arise out of government pro-
curement contracts and employment contracts."9 A new, area of gov-
ernment contract law may be developing, however, in the aftermath
of the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in United States v. Winstar
Corp.4 In Winstar, the Supreme Court held that purchasers of failing
savings and loans41 had valid breach of contract claims against the
United States stemming from the subsequent passage of laws and
regulations that disallowed the use of certain favorable regulatory ac-
counting practices that government agencies had promised would be
available to the purchasers.42 Although Winsta?'s effect will not be
known for some time, the case could dramatically affect the way fed-
eral regulators deal with regulated industries, and, in the process,
could spawn a new species of contract cases in the CFC.4
37. Id. § 1491(a).
38. See id.§ 1491(a)(1).
39. The importance of procurement and employment contracts in the Tucker Act is dem-
onstrated by the inclusion of specific provisions relating to those types of claims. See id.
§ 1491(a) (2). With respect to employment claims, the statute expressly allows the CFC to"issue
orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement
status, and correction of applicable records." Id. The statute refers to procurement by giving
the CFC jurisdiction over claims brought under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 and by giv-
ing the CFC power to award equitable relief prior to contract award. See id.
40. 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
41. Justice Souter defined "the savings and loan, or 'thrift,' industry... as 'a federally-
conceived and assisted system to provide citizens with affordable housing funds.'" Id. at 2440
(quoting H.IR REP. No. 101-54, pt. 1, at 292 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86,88).
42. See id. Writing for the majority, Justice Souter described the issue and holding as fol-
lows:
The issue in this case is the enforceability of contracts between the Government and
participants in a regulated industry, to accord them particular regulatory treatment in
exchange for their assumption of liabilities that threatened to produce claims against
the Government as insurer. Although Congress subsequently changed the relevant
law, and thereby barred the Government from specifically honoring its agreements,
we hold that the terms assigning the risk of regulatory change to the Government are
enforceable, and that the Government is therefore liable in damages for breach.
Id.
The decision is a lengthy and complex dissertation on the intricacies of the sovereign im-
munity doctrine. While it is enormously significant for what it portends for CFCjurisdiction, it
is beyond the scope of this Article. For an analysis of the Supreme Court decision, see Jerry
Stouck & David R. Lipson, United States v. Winstar Corp.: Affirming the Application ofPrivate Con-
tract Law Principles to the Federal Government, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 315 (1996).
43. At the writing of this Article, more than 115 cases alleging Winstar causes of action
SECTION 1500
The CFC's jurisdiction over claims founded upon the Constitution
is its second most important substantive area of jurisdiction, because
this area encompasses takings claims. Surprisingly, takings claims
were not always understood to fall under this branch of the court's
jurisdiction. Prior to its 1946 decision in United States v. Causby," the
Supreme Court had not recognized seizures of property by the gov-
ernment as claims founded upon the Constitution. Instead, where a
plaintiff alleged a governmental invasion of his property pursuant to
statute or regulation, the Court would imply a contract to pay just
compensation and treat the case as a contract actioni 5 But where the
government asserted its own right to title, an implied contract could
not be found.46  In such a case, the seizure constituted a tort for
which the government had not waived sovereign immunity.47 Simi-
larly, where the claim alleged an unauthorized seizure by a govern-
ment official, the Court considered the act a tort and barred suit in
the Court of Claims.48 Decided the same year the Federal Tort
Claims Act waived sovereign immunity for most torts, Causby dis-
carded the Court's prior jurisprudence and held that "[i]f there is a
taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' within the
meaning of the Tucker Act.
4 9
Since Causby, takings claims have become a staple of the CFC's
docket.w They may involve physical invasions, such as where the gov-
ernment floods private property in the construction of a dam,"' or
regulations that deprive a property owner of the economic value of
his property.5 As it did more recently for contract actions in Winstar,
were pending in the Court of Federal Claims. The cases were consolidated for resolution of
common issues under the name Plaintiffs in All Winstar-Related Cases v. United States, No. 90-8C
et al. The potential damages recoverable in these cases reach into the billions.
44. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
45. SeeUnited States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1884) ("The law will im-
ply a promise to make the required compensation, where property, to which the government
asserts no tide, is taken, pursuant to an act of Congress, as private property to be applied for
public uses.").
46. See COWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 45-46 (describing evolution of Court of Claims'
takngsjurisdiction).
47. See id. The plaintiffs only remedy was to petition Congress for private relief, which was
not normally granted. See id.
48. See Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 344 (1879) (holding that unauthorized
seizure of land by federal official is tort for which United States had not waived sovereign im-
munity).
49. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946).
50. See COWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 46 ("Nowadays, the court's taking cases ... provide
much of its work.").
51. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 179-80 (1871) (interpreting
state constitution takings clause).
52. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
(finding regulatory taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(same); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (same).
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the Supreme Court in 1992 opened the door to a new wave of takings
actions with its decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.0 In
Lucas, the Court held that a state may not deprive a landowner of all
economically beneficial use of his land without paying just compensa-
tion unless the uses proscribed would constitute an enjoinable
"nuisance" under state common law.5'
The third major substantive area of CFC jurisdiction is for claims
founded upon "an Act of Congress" or a regulation. Most litigation
arising under this branch of the Tucker Act is for tax refunds.55 Like
takings jurisdiction, tax refund jurisdiction has a complex history. In
Nichols & Co. v. United States,56 decided in 1868, the Supreme Court
held that cases arising under the revenue laws did not fall under the
Tucker Act.57 That rule held sway throughout the remainder of the
19th century, but exceptions gradually reduced its force thereafter.a
Finally, in 1915, in United States v. Emery,59 the Supreme Court aban-
doned Nichols, finding jurisdiction under the Tucker Act over a suit
seeking the refund of corporate taxes.W Today, the CFC has express
concurrent jurisdiction with district courts over tax refund claims. 6'
Tax refund cases now account for about thirty percent of the CFC's
docket. 2
All actions in the CFC under the Tucker Act are governed by three
limiting principles, two stated explicitly in the statute and one the
product of judicial gloss and long-standing practice. First, only the
53. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
54. See id. at 1028-29. The Court in Lucas addressed the question of whether the govern-
ment must payjust compensation when it deprives property of value through a regulation de-
signed to prevent serious public harm. The Court held that the government must meet the
same standard applicable to private plaintiffs to enjoin an activity. See id. at 1029. Lucas has yet
to produce a flood of regulatory takings litigation, but it promises to limit, to some degree, the
areas in which states and the federal government may regulate without cost. In the process, it
seems almost certain to expand the range of regulatory takings litigation in the CFC.
55. See GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAUGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CVL TAX
CoNTRoVERSIEs § 1.01 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing Court of Federal Claims tax litigation jurisdic-
tion). Aggrieved taxpayers may bring suit in district court or the CFC only after paying the full
tax assessed. In order to avoid paying the disputed tax, a taxpayer must bring suit in the United
States Tax Court. See id.
56. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122 (1868).
57. See id. at 131.
58. See United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 10 (1915) (finding jurisdiction under Tucker
Act for suit seeking refund of stamp taxes); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 228 (1901)
(finding jurisdiction under Tucker Act over claim to recover customs duties); South Carolina v.
United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 257 (1904), afd, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (implicitly recognizingjurisdic-
tion over claim by state to recover taxes).
59. 237 U.S. 28 (1915).
60. See id. at 30. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes declared that it was "an inad-
missible premise that the great act of justice embodied in the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims is to be construed strictly and read with an adverse eye." Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (1994).
62. SeeKAFxA& CAVANAUGH, supra note 55, § 1.01.
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United States may be sued in the CFC under the Tucker Act.6 No
other party, including departments and agencies of the United
States, may be named as a defendant.6 Thus, although a plaintiff
may have cognizable claims against both a federal official and the
United States based on the same conduct, she may notjoin both par-
ties as defendants in a single Tucker Act suit in the CFC.
Second, the Tucker Act specifically excludes actions in tort from its
scope.r Because the Tucker Act served for a considerable time as the
principal mechanism for suing the United States, this exclusion used
to have enormous substantive effect as a bar to the waiver of sover-
eign immunity with respect to tort claims.6 With the passage of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, however, the United States consented to
certain tort suits in federal district court.67 The tort exclusion in the
Tucker Act now serves only as a procedural hobgoblin, preventing
plaintiffs from joining valid tort claims with valid contract claims in
the CFC.
Finally, although the statute does not expressly require it, the
Tucker Act has been construed to grant jurisdiction only to claims
for money damages.6 In keeping with the original understanding of
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (providing for CFCjurisdiction over claims"against the United
States").
64. See Fed. Cl. R. 10(a) ("[T]he United States [is] designated as the party defendant in
every case....").
65. See28U.S.C.§ 1491.
66. The effect of the Tucker Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity is uncertain. The stat-
ute has been construed not as a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity for the types of suits it
contemplates, but only as a waiver of sovereign immunity where some other legal rule, statutory
or otherwise, grants a right to relief within the scope of Tucker Actjurisdiction. This interpre-
tation has its origin in United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976), in which the Supreme
Court rejected an argument that the Tucker Act itself waives sovereign immunity for any claim
invoking a federal statute, holding instead that "the Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional, and
grant of a right of action must be made with specificity." Id. at 400. Testan addressed a suit
against the United States in the Court of Claims by government attorneys seeking to have their
employment reclassified at a higher pay grade and an award of back pay. The attorneys
claimed that the Classification Act gives rise to a claim for money damages as a result of an er-
roneous classification. See id. at 399. The Supreme Court found "no provision in the Classifica-
tion Act that expressly makes the United States liable for pay lost through allegedly improper
classifications." Id. at 400.
The Court backed off from the rigidity of Testan, however, in United States v. Mitchell 463 U.S.
206, 210 (1983), a suit for damages for waste and mismanagement of timberlands managed by
the Department of the Interior, brought by the owners of the timberlands. As in Testan, no
statute explicitly granted a right to sue the government in such a case. See id. at 210-11. Never-
theless, the Court found an implied right of action sufficient to supportjurisdiction under the
Tucker Act. See id. at 216. The Court expressly ameliorated its Testan language, holding that
"[i]f a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act, the United States has presumptively con-
sented to suit." Id.
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 ("The United States shall be liable ... to tort claims, in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances....").
68. See United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3 (1969) (stating that Tucker Act does not include
awards in equitable matters, and jurisdiction has been interpreted by the Court to include only
money damages).
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the role of the Court of Claims, the CFC does not have a generalized
power to award equitable relief.6 Nevertheless, the courts have con-
sistently held that equitable doctrines are available "as an incident" to
a claim for money damages, such as in the use of reformation or re-
cission in contract actions alleging frustration or mutual mistake.70
B. District Court Jurisdiction
Unlike the CFC, district courts have very broad jurisdiction, ex-
tending to most cases involving issues of federal law and to many
cases involving state law. 7' District courts historically have provided
the primary avenue for seeking redress for government action in
cases outside the narrow scope of the original Tucker Act, through
the mechanism of suits against government agents. 72 These actions
may be brought against a government official or against an agency if
a statute subjects the agency to suit. 7 Although suits against federal
officials and agencies may arise under state law, as a practical matter
federal district courts are the default fora; if an action is brought
69. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557 (1962) ("From the beginning [the Court
of Claims] has been given jurisdiction only to award damages, not specific relief.") (citations
omitted).
70. See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 1308, 1315 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (allowing
rescission of contract and finding that "[e]quitable doctrines can be employed incidentally to
this court's general monetary jurisdiction either as equitable procedures to arrive at a money
judgment, or as substantive principles on which to base the award of a money judgment")
(internal citations omitted);see also United States v. Milliken Imprinting Co., 202 U.S. 168, 173-
74 (1906) (granting reformation on ground that effect of reformation is to confer right to
money damages). In addition to the "incidental" equitable power the courts have assumed, the
Tucker Act has been amended to provide for equitable relief in certain specific areas. Under
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a), as amended:
(2) To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the judgment,
the [CFC] may... issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement
in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records .... In
any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the power to remand appropriate
matters to any administrative or executive body or official with such direction as it may
deem proper and just.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (2).
71. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDiCrION §§ 5.2.1, 5.3.1 (2d ed. 1994) (describ-
ing federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts). Federal ques-
tion jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
which gives the district courts jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $50,000 and the parties are citizens of different states or foreign countries. See id.
§ 1332.
72. See STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 477 (describing four common-law orders avail-
able to review acts of government officials). The four common-law orders for reviewing the
acts of government officials were certiorari and habeas corpus, used to review the acts of courts;
mandamus, used to compel the performance of a specific duty; and prohibition, used to pre-
vent a government officer from acting in a way he had no legal power to act. See id.
73. Only individuals and government corporations statutorily given the power to sue and
be sued are subject to suit. See id. at 478. Departments, bureaus, and commissions are not enti-
ties capable of being sued. See id.
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against a federal official or agency in state court, the defendant may
remove it to federal court.74
The slow erosion of sovereign immunity has broadened the areas
in which the United States may be sued in federal district court. To-
day, in addition to their jurisdiction over suits involving government
agents, district courts have significant jurisdiction over claims directly
against the United States. The result is a patchwork of jurisdiction
covering each of the three main common-law areas of litigation:
torts, contracts, and equity.
1. Tort suits in district court
The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), passed in 1946, fundamen-
tally altered the landscape in tort suits stemming from government
conduct. Under the FTCA, the United States is "liable ... to tort
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances."75 The effect of the FTCA is to allow
suits against the United States in the same situations in which a
common-law "master" is liable for the torts of his "servant."76 District
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over FTCA claims.7 Before pursu-
ing an FTCA claim in district court, however, the plaintiff must sub-
mit the claim to the agency involved and seek administrative reliefs
Recovery under the FTCA is limited in several ways. First, the
United States accepts liability only for its agents' negligent acts; a
plaintiff generally cannot sue the United States for the intentional
torts of its agents and cannot sue under a theory of strict liability.7
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1) (stating that civil action commenced in state court against
.any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency
thereof" may be removed by them to United States district court). In addition to the existence
of the removal statute, recent changes to federal jurisdictional statutes have ensured that any
claim against a federal official involving federal law will proceed in federal district court. With
the 1976 amendments to the Administrative Procedures Act (discussed below), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 was amended to remove the amount-in-controversy requirement for district court fed-
eral question jurisdiction against government officers. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105
(1977) ("The obvious effect of [the elimination of the amount-in-controversy requirement) ...
is to conferjurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action .... ."). Section 1331 was later
amended to eliminate the amount-in-controversy requirement in all federal question litigation.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
76. See PicHARD A. GIVENS, MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.131 (4th ed. 1991) ("The
United States is liable for the [torts] of an employee acting within the scope of employment, as
determined by the law of respondeat superior of the state where the tort was committed.").
77. See28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
78. See id. § 2675(a).
79. See id. § 2680(h) (excluding from scope of FTCA "[a]ny claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract rights"); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 45 (1953) (holding that FTCA"requires a negligent act"). Certain intentional torts,
such as trespass and conversion, are actionable under the FTCA. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note
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Second, the United States is not liable for claims "based upon the ex-
ercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an em-
ployee of the Government. '  This limitation simply extends to the
United States the long-standing discretionary function defense avail-
able to government officers.8
With slim exceptions, the FTGA makes the United States the only
available defendant in a suit alleging a government tort by barring all
suits against an officer or agency for any "negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment. ",1 Upon certification by the
United States Attorney General that an act was done within the scope
of an official's employment, the action is deemed to be against the
United States.83 Because the FTCA excludes most intentional torts,
the rules precluding all suits against government officials for
"wrongful" conduct in the scope of employment can leave victims of
intentional torts by government agents without any remedy.84 In ad-
71, § 9.2.3 (discussing scope of FTCA liability).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). In implementing the discretionary function exception to FTCA
liability, the Supreme Court has relied in large part on a distinction between planning func-
tions and operational functions. The Court has held that planning involves the use of judg-
ment, i.e., discretion, and so is not actionable. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 42 (overruling award of
damages because "decisions held culpable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than
operational level").
81. The provision in the FTCA referring to "discretionary" acts incorporates the tradi-
tional rule of executive immunity, which gives absolute immunity to any government official
exercising his judgment and discretion in performing governmental acts. SeeKendall v. Stokes,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 87,98 (1845) ("[A] public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error
in a case where the act to be done ... is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judg-
ment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his mistake.").
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1). Section 2679 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not
be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cogni-
zable under section 1346(b) of this title, and the remedies provided by this title in
such cases shall be exclusive.
(b) (1)The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of
this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting
from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against
the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such
employee. Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or
relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee's estate is
precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred.
Id. § 2679.
83. Seeid. § 2679(d)(1).
84. See Mitchell v. Carlson, 896 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1990). Mitchell shows the mixed bless-
ings of the FTCA. A nurse at a military facility sued her superior for assault and battery in state
court. See id. at 130. The superior got a certification from the U.S. Attorney's office that she
was acting in the scope of her employment, and then removed the case to federal court. See id.
The United States was substituted as defendant, and it then moved to dismiss on the ground
that the plaintiff had not submitted an administrative claim to the Army. See id. The district
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dition, the FTCA precludes any liability where a government em-
ployee exercises due care in carrying out any statutory mandate.8s
The principal exception to the FTCA's occasionally draconian pre-
clusion rules is in claims for constitutional torts. In the landmark de-
cision Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Bureau of Narcotics, the
Supreme Court inferred a right to sue for money damages for torts
by federal officials that violate constitutional rights. The FTCA does
not preclude Bivens actions against federal officials as individuals.88
The FTCA does, however, allow a plaintiff injured by a constitutional
tort to sue the United States, and any suit against the United States
precludes a Bivens suit based on the same injury.8
2. Breach of contract suits
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2), dubbed "The Little Tucker Act," vests in
the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the CFC over Tucker
Act claims not exceeding $10,000. 90 Excluded from the jurisdiction
of the district courts are government contract cases covered by the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978.91 Because of this exclusion, and be-
cause takings claims invariably exceed $10,000, district courts have
minimal Tucker Act jurisdiction. Effectively, the Little Tucker Act
court denied dismissal, and instead resubstituted defendants and remanded the case on the
ground that it did not have jurisdiction over an intentional tort suit under the FTCA. See id.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the court did have jurisdiction and that the nurse's
claims should be dismissed for the failure to file an administrative claim. See id. at 136.
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The provision in the act barring suit where an employee exer-
cises due care in executing a statute prevents the FTCA from being used to challenge the con-
stitutionality of a statute. SeeCHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, § 9.2.
86. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
87. See id. at 392. Prior to Bivens, a citizen who suffered damages as a result of an invasion
of his constitutional rights by a federal official had no available monetary remedy. Bivens effec-
tively created a cause of action against federal officials parallel to the causes of action available
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights violations by state officials. The discretionary function
defense available to state officials under section 1983 is also available to federal officials in
Bivens suits. SeeButzv. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978).
88. See28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2) (A).
89. See id. § 2676. Bivens suits are further limited by doctrines of executive immunity. All
federal officials normally have absolute immunity from suit when engaged in the discretionary
duties that are within the scope of their offices. See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-98
(1988).
In Bivens actions, all federal officials have qualified immunity for their discretionary acts,
meaning they are immune from suit unless the conduct violates clearly established rights of
which a reasonable person would know. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2). The "Little Tucker Act" provides that the district courts
shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the CFC of
[a]ny... civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in
amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regula-
tion of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
91. Seeid.
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gives district courts jurisdiction only over the smallest contract ac-
tions.
Notwithstanding the Little Tucker Act, the potential exists for sig-
nificant district court jurisdiction over contract actions against offi-
cers and agencies. In general, contract claims against federal agen-
cies seeking money damages have been allowed where an applicable
"sue and be sued" clause subjects the agency to such a suit and where
the relief sought is limited to funds in the possession and control of
the agency.92 Where the suit would reach funds in the United States
Treasury, the suit may be considered a suit against the United States,
maintainable only in the CFC under the Tucker Act.93
Contract claims seeking equitable remedies both against agencies
and against the United States are discussed in the next section, in the
context of claims for equitable relief.
3. Claims for equitable relief
Because of their potential to restrict government activity, suits seek-
ing injunctions and other equitable remedies pose particularly diffi-
cult sovereign immunity issues. Prior to 1976, it was nearly impossi-
ble to get an injunction against the United States." Injunctions were
sometimes available against government officials, but courts used the
sovereign immunity doctrine and the principle of indispensable par-
ties to dismiss actions against officials that crossed the line into suits
against the government.95 Under Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp.,9 an action seeking an injunction against a federal official
92. See Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552, 1557 (1lth Cir. 1986) (recognizing contract suit in
district court against Department of Housing and Urban Development under "sue and be
sued" clause); Crowel v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 699 F.2d 347, 351 n.1 (7th Cir.
1983) (recognizing contract suit for money damages under "sue and be sued" clause); Munoz
v. Small Bus. Admin., 644 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981).
93. See Marcus Garvey Square, Inc. v. Winston Burnett Constr. Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d
1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that where judgment would be paid by United States, con-
tract action for more than $10,000 must be in Court of Claims).
94. Prior to the 1976 amendments to the APA expressly allowing injunctions against the
United States, the provisions of the APA providing for judicial review of agency action were the
basic method of affirmatively challenging the United States' exercise of its executive powers.
See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is enti-
tled to judicial review thereof."). In some cases, a court's order directed to an agency had the
practical effect of an injunction. See PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 236-37 (Carolina Academic Press 1989) ("In connection with
APA review, the court may issue any but monetary relief: orders of enforcement, declaratory
judgments, compulsory orders directing the agency or its officials either to act or to refrain
from acting, or-most commonly-judgments upholding or setting aside ... the results of
agency action.").
95. SeeJoseph D. Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,
59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1065-66 (1946).
96. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity unless it was based
on conduct outside the scope of the official's statutory authority or
undertaken pursuant to an unconstitutional grant of authority.
9 7
Larson served as the primary authority on sovereign immunity in
injunction suits against government officials until Congress amended
§ 702 of the Administrative Procedures Act in 1976. The amended
language provides that "[a]n action in a court of the United States
seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an
agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an
official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dis-
missed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against
the United States or that the United States is an indispensable
party."" This language was intended to "remove[] the defense of
sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial review of federal administra-
tive action otherwise subject to judicial review."9 While the amend-
ment to § 702 eliminated the defense of sovereign immunity, both as
to government agents and as to the United States, it expressly re-
tained all other available defenses, including the discretionary func-
tion defense."
The waiver of sovereign immunity for suits seeking equitable relief
against the United States has resulted in confusion over the types of
claims now cognizable in district court. Section 702 waives sovereign
immunity only for actions "seeking relief other than money dam-
ages."' O' Because the CFC's general jurisdiction extends only to suits
for monetary relief, it seems logical that § 702 should apply to waive
sovereign immunity and confer jurisdiction on district courts in pre-
cisely those cases in which the CFC would not have jurisdiction. But
§ 702 has not been interpreted that neatly.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen v. Massachu-
97. See id. at 689-90. Larson involved a suit by a government contractor alleging that the
government had contracted to sell coal to the plaintiff, but had failed to deliver the coal. The
plaintiff sued the head of the War Assets Administration, seeking an injunction prohibiting him
from delivering the coal to anyone else. Expressly recognizing that this and other officers
might be liable for money damages in such a case, the Court held that the injunction suit could
not proceed because the suit was, in substance, a suit to compel the government to act. See id.
at 688-89.
98. See5 U.S.C. § 702.
99. See H.L REP. No. 94-1656, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6121.
100. See id. at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. at 6131. The committee report specified
that the statute would not affect the following defenses:
(1) extraordinary relief should not be granted because of the hardship to the defen-
dant or to the public ("balancing the equities") or because the plaintiff has an ade-
quate remedy at law, (2) action committed to agency discretion; (3) express or im-
plied preclusion of judicial review;, (4) standing; (5) ripeness; (6) failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (7) an exclusive alternative remedy.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
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setts, 0 2 § 702 further stirs the murky jurisdictional waters in suits
against the government. Bowen involved a suit by the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts to compel the federal government to pay a portion
of the federal Medicaid contribution that the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") had determined was not allowed."
Massachusetts sued the Secretary of HHS and the United States in
federal district court asking the court to "[einjoin the Secretary ...
from failing or refusing to reimburse [Massachusetts] ... [for] the
federal share of expenditures for medical expenses to eligible resi-
dents .. .."'04 The government argued that, although it nominally
sought an injunction, the suit was in practical effect for "money dam-
ages"--the payment of the disallowed funds-and was therefore out-
side the purview of § 702.'05
The Supreme Court held that the suit was cognizable under § 702
because the monetary relief it sought was a form of specific relief.
The Court distinguished between claims seeking compensatory
money damages and claims seeking specific relief requiring a mone-
tary payment, and found that the Medicaid reimbursements were
fundamentally different from a damage award designed to compen-
sate for a past injury.' 6
The Court strongly suggested that relief of the type sought in
Bowen would not be available in the CFC because the Bowen monetary
remedy constituted equitable relief.'0 7 But at the same time, relying
102. 487 U.S. 879 (1987).
103. See id. at 887. Under the Medicaid program, states request "reimbursements" for cov-
ered Medicaid expenditures. See id. at 883-84. These reimbursements are actually huge ad-
vance payments based on estimated future expenditures. Overpayments can be withheld from
future advances or retained by the states until disputes are resolved. See id. at 884. In Bowen,
Health and Human Services disallowed a portion of Massachusetts' previously received reim-
bursements. See id. at 886-87. It was not clear to the Court whether the government actually
retained the disallowed amounts or simply notified Massachusetts that it planned to retain
them. See id. at 887 nn.8-9. Massachusetts sued to enjoin the government from "refusing to
reimburse" it for the disallowed amounts. See id. at 887 n.10.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 891.
106. See id. at 893-94.
Our cases have long recognized the distinction between an action at law for damages-
-which are intended to provide a victim with monetary compensation for an injury to
his person, property, or reputation-and an equitable action for specific relief-
which may include an order providing for. . . "the recovery of specific property or mo-
nies .... " The fact that ajudicial remedy may require one party to pay money to an-
other is not a sufficient reason to characterize the relief as "money damages."
Id. (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,688 (1949)).
107. See id. at 905-07. The Court opined that the monetary relief contemplated might fall
outside the CFC'sjurisdiction to award compensatory damages because
(g]iven the fact that the quarterly payments of federal money are actually advances
against expenses that have not yet been incurred by the State, it is arguable that a dis-
pute concerning the status of the open account is not one in which the State can
claim an entitlement to a specific sum of money that the Federal Government owes it.
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on Judge Robert Bork's opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Maryland De-
partment of Human Resources v. Department of Health & Human Sero-
ices,'0 the Court found that the term "money damages" in § 702 was
not intended to correspond with the category of monetary relief
available in the CFC under the Tucker Act.'0 Judge Bork concluded,
and the Supreme Court agreed, that the exclusion of "money dam-
ages" in § 702 was not intended to remove from the district court's
jurisdiction the precise category of cases available in the CFC."0
Bowen thus leaves open the possibility that some types of monetary re-
lief could fall under the jurisdictions of both forums.
The Federal Circuit, the primary arbiter of all Tucker Act issues,
reached a similarly imprecise holding in a case slightly different from
Bowen. In Far West Federal Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision,'" inves-
tors in a failed savings and loan, relying on a theory similar to that
raised in Winstar,'2 sued the bank's regulatory agencies in federal dis-
trict court. In addition to injunctive and declaratory relief, the
plaintiffs sought monetary relief-in the form of recission and resti-
tution-couched in equitable terms."4  The defendants moved to
sever and transfer the monetary claims to the Claims Court on the
ground that, because the Office of Thrift Supervision's "sue and be
sued" clause prohibited suits for money damages, the claims were
Id. at 907. This reasoning seems illogical in light of the Court's conclusion that Massachusetts
was seeking specific relief because it was seeking a specific sum of money due. The Court also
suggested that the CFC might not have any jurisdiction over a claim arising out of the Medicaid
Act-no matter the relief sought-because the Medicaid Act could be construed not to grant
a right to compensatory relief for damages sustained pursuant to its provisions. See id& at 905-
06 & n.42.
108. 763 F.2d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
109. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 899 (citing Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. Department
of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 144748 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Judge Bork concluded
from sovereign immunity case law that Congress, in drafting the amendments to § 702,"would
have understood the recovery of specific monies to be specific relief," and not the recovery of
monetary relief available under the Tucker Act. See Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, 763 F.2d
at 1447.
110. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 899.
111. 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
112. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
113. See Far West, 930 F.2d at 885-86. The plaintiffs alleged that they had a contract with the
regulating agencies that promised them more lenient than normal regulatory capital require-
ments. After the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act,
the newly created Office of Thrift Supervision eliminated the more lenient capital require-
ments. The plaintiffs sued seeking declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the regula-
tory agencies from breaching the contract. The plaintiffs also sought recission of the contract
and restitution of the funds the plaintiffs had invested in the thrift, and compensation for viola-
tion of Fifth Amendment due process rights. The claim for due process violations was trans-
ferred to the Claims Court. See id. at 887.
114. See id. at 887. The complaint sought "restitution of the funds invested in Far West, to-
gether with the enhancement of the Bank's value that has occurred since the conversion, plus
interest, expenses incurred, and such further relief as equity permits." Id.
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really contract claims against the United States. Without deciding
whether the claims in fact sought "money damages," the Federal Cir-
cuit held that sovereign immunity had been waived no matter how
the claims were characterized." 6 The court concluded that the un-
derlying policies favoring heightened exposure to suit militated in fa-
vor of allowing a single court to resolve all related claims.1
7
As a result of Bowen and Far West, the potential exists for significant
overlap in district court and CFC jurisdiction to hear non-tort claims
for monetary relief against the United States. Both the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit seem willing to accept that claims for
monetary relief stemming from relational duties are not always con-
tract claims for money damages within the meaning of the Tucker
Act. The resulting grey areas will inevitably create problems for liti-
gants and courts interpreting the application of § 1500.
II. SECTION 1500 OFTHEJUDICIAL CODE
A. Histoy and Interpretation Prior to 1992
The predecessor to § 1500 was enacted in 1868 to relieve the
United States of the burden of defending duplicative lawsuits filed in
the district courts and the Court of Claims."8 A key ingredient in ac-
complishing that goal was establishing a means to identify duplicative
lawsuits. The statute identifies duplicative lawsuits in terms of claims:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have jurisdic-
tion of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his as-
signee has pending in any other court any suit or process against
the United States or any person who, at the time when the cause of
action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto,
acting or professing to act, directly or indirectly under the authority
of the United States." 9
Thus, a plaintiff may not pursue a claim in the CFC if he has an-
other suit "for" that claim or "in respect to" that claim pending in a
115. Seeid. at891.
116. See id. at 887-94.
117. See id. at 892.
118. Speaking in favor of the bill in the Senate, Senator Edmunds of Vermont declared that
[t]he object of this amendment is to put to their election that large class of persons
having cotton claims particularly, who have sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the
other agents of the Government in more than a hundred suits that are now pending,
scattered over the country here and there, and who are here at the same time endeav-
oring to prosecute their claims, and have filed them in the Court of Claims, so that af-
ter they put the Government to the expense of beating them once in a court of law
they can turn around and try the whole question in the Court of Claims.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2769 (1868).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (1994).
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district court.'" The statute applies whether the district court suit is
against the United States or against an agent of the United States.
Section 1500 has proved to be an effective weapon in curtailing
duplicative suits against the government and its agents.' But its suc-
cess in achieving its broad goals has come without the establishment
of a rational and consistentjurisprudence. The Court of Claims and
its successors have never clearly defined the term "claim" for § 1500
purposes. As a result, there is not a clear standard-particularly
when equitable claims are involved-for determining when a Court
of Claims suit will be barred by the existence of a district court suit.' 2
1. Early interpretations of the term "claim"
The Court of Claims avoided any real discussion of the meaning of
"claim" until 1939, when it decided British American Tobacco Co. v.
120. The statute would apply to suits in any court, but because of the elimination of the
amount in controversy requirement in federal question cases and the amendment of the re-
moval statute to allow federal officials to remove any action against them to federal court,
§ 1500 virtually always applies to suits in federal district court.
121. The most exacting tool used by the Court of Claims to defeat duplicative suits has been
the statute of limitations. Section 1500 requires plaintiffs doubtful of the proper forum to
choose between the Court of Claims and a district court. In many cases, that election can be
difficult to make. For example, maritime contracts fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of dis-
trict courts, but non-maritime contracts fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFC. Be-
cause arbitrary rules determine what is a maritime contract, plaintiffs can easily get caught in
the wrong court. See, e.g., Northwest Marine Iron Works v. United States, 493 F.2d 652, 655 (Ct.
Cl. 1974) (holding that, although contract to procure insurance for ship is non-maritime con-
tract, contract for actual insurance for ship is maritime contract enforceable only in district
court). Before the passage of the transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1631, if such a plaintiff chose the
wrong court but did not receive a decision on that issue until after the expiration of the statute
of limitations in the proper court, he could be permanently barred from pursuing his claims.
The transfer statute, allowing transfers between district courts and the Court of Claims, greatly
reduces this problem. See id. Nevertheless, because the statutes of limitations applicable in the
Court of Claims and in the district courts frequently differ, a plaintiff gambling on jurisdiction
in the forum with the longer statute may find his suit barred if that court declines jurisdiction
and the suit was filed after the expiration of the statute in the other forum.
122. The meaning of "claim" is, unfortunately, not the only confusing part of § 1500'sjuris-
prudence. There is also uncertainty as to timing. For example, although § 1500 by its terms
applies only to a suit brought in the Court of Claims after a suit on the same claim has been
filed in a district court, the Court of Claims has generally read the statute to divest the Court of
Claims ofjurisdiction where the situation is reversed, and the district court action follows the
Court of Claims action. See, e.g., Hobbs v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 646, 647-48 (1964) (hold-
ing no jurisdiction where day after filing Court of Claims petition, plaintiff filed appeal of ad-
ministrative action in court of appeals); Maguire Indus., Inc. v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 905,
906-907 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (finding no jurisdiction where, subsequent to filing petition in Court of
Claims, plaintiff appealed Tax Court decision to court of appeals). But the Court of Claims
cast doubt on that rule in Tecon Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965), in
which the court held that a complaint filed in district court subsequent to a petition in the
Court of Claims did not defeat jurisdiction under § 1500. See id. at 943-46 (explaining how
plaintiff moved for dismissal after deciding that he preferred litigating case in district court).
The court ignored previous cases holding the opposite in similar situations, apparently because
of the facts of the case. See id. at 949 (indicating that any other ruling would put court's control
of itsjurisdiction at the "mere whim of a litigant").
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United States. In British American, the plaintiff delivered an amount
of gold bullion to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as required
by executive orders and regulations regarding the surrender of
gold. 2 4 Alleging that it was owed more for the gold than it was paid,
the plaintiff filed suits the same day in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York and in the Court of
Claims.1ss The district court suit was a tort action against the Federal
Reserve, and the Court of Claims suit was a contract action against
the United States. 126 The two actions sought the same monetary re-
covery based on the same facts.22 The Court of Claims dismissed the
suit before it, based on the predecessor to § 1500. The court found
that a "claim" is identified "in respect of the subject matter or prop-
erty in respect of which the claim was made," rather than upon the
legal theory asserted.Iss Because the subject matter of the two suits
was the same, the suits were "in respect of' the same claim29
British American's "subject matter" test, although a little vague, po-
tentially provided some certainty by establishing that the substance of
the claim-rather than the legal theory, the remedy, or anything else
that is part of a cause of action-is the sole factor to consider in iden-
tifying claims.' ° The test has been interpreted to establish "operative
facts" as the primary yardstick for measuring claims." But the consis-
123. 89 Ct. Cl. 438 (1939).
124. See id. at 439.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 440.
127. See id. at 439 (suing in each case for recovery of $4,331,509.75).
128. See id. at 440; see alsoJohns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (affirming that claim is "to be defined by the facts" and not based on legal theories).
129. See British Am. Tobacco, 89 Ct. CL. at 440 (noting that plaintiffs attempts"to adapt the
single claim to the jurisdiction of the different courts... [did] not obscure the unity or same-
ness of the claim"). British American Tobacco addressed the timing issue in addition to the claim
issue. Although the two suits were filed at the same time, the district court suit had been dis-
missed and an appeal taken and denied before the Court of Claims ruled on the government's
§ 1500 motion. See id. at 440-41. In dismissing the suit before it, the Court of Claims effectively
stated that its jurisdiction under § 1500 is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint
in the Court of Claims. See id. at 441 (holding that once a fully adjudicated suit is dismissed, it
does not convert the case into a no longer "pending" case for purposes of a determination of
jurisdiction). The opinion is not clear, but the court implied that § 1500 would bar not only a
claim that is pending when the Court of Claims action is filed and that is subsequently dis-
missed, but also any claim that had been previously disposed on the merits in district court. See
id. at 440 (detailing how plaintiff tried for second round of prosecution in Court of Claims af-
ter same claim was unsuccessful and dismissed in other court). "There is no provision that a
suit in this court against the United States may be prosecuted if the suit in another court
against an agent of the United States is dismissed by final adjudication upon the merits." Id. at
441. The court may have read § 1500 to operate as an automatic resjudicata bar despite the
plain language addressing the statute only to "pending" claims. For more information on
§ 1500 and resjudicata, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
130. See British Am. Tobacco, 89 Ct. Cl. at 440-41.
131. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 201 (1993); see also Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994);Johns-Manville, 855 F.2d at 1262.
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tency promised in British American has not come to pass. Less than
twenty years after the decision, the Court of Claims injected a new
and variable element by holding in Casman v. United Stateds2 that un-
der certain circumstances, § 1500 does not apply to simultaneous
claims based on the same operative facts.""
2. The Casman exception
Casman involved a former government employee who alleged a
wrongful discharge.1  He brought suit in federal district court
against the Secretary of State seeking reinstatement to his former po-
sition, and won.Iss The Secretary appealed the decision, and while
the appeal was pending, the plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Claims
against the United States for back pay. 6 The government sought to
dismiss the Court of Claims suit based on § 1500. 7
The Court of Claims held that it had jurisdiction over the plain-
tiff's back pay claim'ss The court focused on the purpose of the stat-
ute: to force an election between suit in the Court of Claims and suit
in another court. 9 The court apparently assumed the statute was
meant to apply only where the plaintiff had the option of pursuing
his claims in either forum. Because the plaintiff in Casman could
bring its equitable claim only in district court and its back pay claim
only in the Court of Claims, the court held § 1500 inapplicable. 40
It is unclear whether the election the Casman court believed neces-
sary for § 1500 to apply was an election of legal theories or an elec-
tion of remedies.14' According to the Federal Circuit, the term
132. 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956).
133. See id. at 649-50 (holding that litigant seeking monetary relief in Court of Claims did
not have "pending" suit in other court where that suit was for injunctive relief only).
134. See id. at 648.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 650 (noting that a claim for back pay is within the excusivejurisdiction of the
Court of Claims).
139. See id. at 649.
140. Id. at 650 (noting that the plaintiff can sue in more than one court as long as it has no
choice in deciding where to bring those suits and its claims and requested relief are not identi-
cal). The court concluded that:
Since plaintiff has no right to elect between two courts, section 1500 is inapplicable in
this case. To hold otherwise would be to say to plaintiff, "If you want your job back
you must forget your back pay"; conversely, "If you want your back pay, you cannot
have yourjob back." Certainly that is not the language of the statute nor the intent of
Congress.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
141. See generally Payson R. Peabody et al., A Confederate Ghost that Haunts the Federal Courts:
The Case for Repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1500, 4 FED. CIR. B.J. 95, 104 (1994) (discussing confusion over
§ 1500 in wake of Casman decision).
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"claim" has no fixed meaning.42 As a result, it is not surprising that
courts applying Casman have interpreted it in both ways.'45
3. Interpretations of Casman
In City of Santa Clara v. United States,'" the city of Santa Clara, Cali-
fornia, reached an agreement with a federal government electric
power producer to purchase electricity directly rather than through a
middleman utility company." The government agency then stopped
selling the city electricity, thereby requiring Santa Clara to purchase
its electricity at a much higher cost from a utility company, PG&E.
46
Rather than pay PG&E, the city put its electricity expenses into es-
crow and sued the Government in federal district court, seeking a
declaratory judgment and an injunction requiring the Government
to sell the elecricity to Santa Clara. 47 The injunction would have en-
titled the city to recover the funds it put in escrow.48 When the dis-
trict court action bogged down, the city filed suit for breach of con-
tract in the Court of Claims.4 4 The Court of Claims held that, under
Casman, the suit before it was not barred because the monetary
remedies sought in the Court of Claims could not be obtained in the
district court.'
In a number of cases, the courts have applied Casman to distin-
guish claims seeking the same or similar relief, but based on different
legal theories. Prillman v. United States'5' involved a dismissed gov-
ernment employee who brought a claim for compensation under the
Back Pay Act in the Court of Claims, and simultaneously sued for
142. See Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(explaining that the term "claim" lacks plain meaning, having no express definition or particu-
lar legislative history to illuminate its meaning).
143. Compare Prillman v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 677, 679 (1979) (arguing that plaintiff
may pursue litigation based on the same operative facts in two separate courts as long as not
producing duplicate remedies), with Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 290, 299 (1991) (deciding
that the Casman exception permits the transfer of equitable claims to district court while simulta-
neously retaining monetary claims in the Claims Court).
144. 215 Ct. Cl. 890 (1977).
145. See id. at 891 (noting that Central Valley Project, a federal Government power pro-
ducer, reserved the right to withdraw from an agreement to sell power directly to the city of
Santa Clara).
146. See id. (noting that purchasing from PG&E cost six times more than purchasing from
the Government).
147. See id. at 892.
148. See id. at 893 (noting that the escrow agreement would likely make a Court of Claims
case moot if the district court ruled in plaintiffs favor).
149. See id. at 892 (arguing that money damages were a necessary remedy for breach of con-
tract).
150. See id. at 892-93 (holding that plaintiff should not be forced to choose between either
monetary or injunctive relief).
151. 220 Ct. Cl. 677 (1979).
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"equitable relief' under Title VII in district court. 1 2 Responding to
the Government's motion to dismiss the suit based on § 1500, the
Court of Claims found that:
In this situation, plaintiffs claim straddles a jurisdictional
boundary between this court and the district court. The district
court has jurisdiction over Title VII and relief thereunder while this
court does not. However, the district court does not have jurisdic-
tion over civil actions against the United States under the Back Pay
Act, for example, in excess of $10,000."'53
Based on this rationale, the court found it had jurisdiction to hear
plaintiff's Back Pay Act claim, pending resolution of the district court
case.' Although the court spoke in terms of the "relief' available
under Title VII in distinguishing the district court claim, the plaintiff
actually sought both equitable and monetary remedies in both
courts, in the form of reinstatement and back pay.55 Thus, the case
makes sense only if it is read to distinguish plaintiffs multiple suits
on the basis of the legal theories pleaded.'5
In Hossein v. United States,57 the Court of Claims again distin-
guished claims based on the legal theory pleaded. The plaintiff in
Hossein filed identical suits in the Court of Claims and district court,
alleging breach of an implied contract, negligence, and a claim for
equitable relief.'8 The Court of Claims dismissed the negligence and
equity counts, but retained jurisdiction over the breach of contract
claim because it sought an amount in excess of $10,000.1-" On that
basis, the court found that it would be "improper" for it to dismiss
the claim before it, despite the fact that claims based on the same
operative facts, but pleading different legal theories, were pending in
district court."W
152. See id. at 678.
153. Id. at 679 (internal citations omitted).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 678 (noting that the plaintiff sought reinstatement and back pay in both dis-
trict court and the Court of Claims).
156. See id. at 679 (allowing plaintiff to maintain a Back Pay Act claim for damages in excess
of $10,000 in the Court of Claims where plaintiff had similar claim pending in district court
and district court relief was limied to $10,000).
157. 218 Ct. CL. 727 (1978).
158. See id. at 728. The plaintiff's agent brought lapis lazuli into the United States and was
compelled to surrender it to Customs officials. When the agent returned to collect it, Customs
failed to deliver it. The plaintiff alleged breach of an implied contract, negligence, and the
existence of a bailment, which entitled it to specific relief. See id.
159. See id. at 728-29 (asserting lack of jurisdiction over negligence and equitable claims,
but exclusive jurisdiction over implied-in-fact contract claims in excess of $10,000).
160. See id. (noting that the court had exclusive jurisdiction over the breach of contract
claim, but refraining from ruling on the claim so as to avoid piecemeal litigation).
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Hossein is striking in its failure to recognize the conflict it creates.16'
In British American, the court held that claims are the same under
§ 1500 if they arise out of the same operative facts. 62 British American
barred a breach of contract claim in the Court of Claims when the
plaintiff had a tort claim simultaneously pending in district court."'
Hossein disregards British American entirely, holding that under Cas-
man, the existence of a tort claim based on the same operative facts
in district court does not divest the Court of Claims of jurisdiction.'6
Moreover, the Court of Claims reinforced Hossein in Allied Materials
& Equipment Co. v. United States.'6 In Allied Materials, the court al-
lowed a breach of contract suit to proceed even though the plaintiff
was at the same time pursuing a district court action on the same set
of facts against federal employees and seeking similar relief for anti-
trust violations and tortious interference with contract.6
Without overruling any cases, the Federal Circuit appeared to un-
dercut the holdings of Hossein, Prillman, and Allied Materials in Johns-
Manville Corp. v. United States,'6 7 the circuit court's first full exposition
of the meaning of "claim" in § 1500.a In Johns-Manville, several de-
fendants in mass tort asbestos litigation sued the Government for in-
demnification in the Claims Court while simultaneously suing the
Government in tort in two district courts.'6 All claims were based on
161. See Cases and Recent Deuelopments, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 361, 362 (1992) (discussing various
exceptions to § 1500 and how the Hossein decision deviates from the purpose of§ 1500).
162. See British Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 438, 441 (1939) (deciding that
two separate claims are not created if they are based on the same facts, even if they sound sepa-
rate in contract and tort).
163. See id. at 440 (finding that the term "claim" has nothing to do with the legal theory
presented by plaintiff and, therefore, barring plaintiffs contract claim).
164. See Hossein, 218 Ct. Cl. at 728-29 (discussing Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction over
implied-in-fact contracts even though tort litigation on the same operative facts exists in district
court). See generally Peabody et al., supra note 141, at 104 (discussing the difficulties of reconcil-
ing the holdings of Casman and British Am. Tobacco).
165. 210 Ct. Cl. 714 (1976).
166. See id. at 715 (refusing to dismiss a Court of Claims suit, despite the existence of a si-
multaneous district court action, because defendant could not have brought all of its claims in
a single court). Relying on Casman, the court found that, because the plaintiff could not com-
bine all his claims in one forum, § 1500 did not apply. See id. at 715-16.
167. 855 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
168. See id.
169. See id. at 1557-59. Johns-Manville had been sued by shipyard workers who were ex-
posed to asbestos manufactured byjohns-Manville and sold to the United States government.
See id. at 1557. In one district court, Johns-Manville sued the United States for indemnification
for its actual and potential liabilities based on the Federal Tort Claims Act. Johns-Manville al-
leged negligence on the part of the United States in its use of the asbestos products, in its
breach of implied warranties to Johns-Manville, and in failing to reveal knowledge of the dan-
gers of asbestos. See id. at 1558. In another district court, Johns-Manville filed third-party com-
plaints for indemnification alleging the United States had breached both warranties to Johns-
Manville and its duty to maintain a safe workplace. See id. at 1558-59. After filing those suits,
Johns-Manville brought suit in the Claims Court alleging breach of an implied warranty of
specifications, breach of a duty to reveal superior knowledge, mutual mistake, and entitlement
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the same operative facts and sought monetary relief, although they
did so under different legal theories . 7  The Claims Court dismissed
the case before it based on § 1500.17 1
The Federal Circuit affirmed in a comprehensive decision in which
the court examined the plain language of the statute, principles of
statutory construction, the legislative history, the case law, and even
Black's Law Dictionary to discover the meaning of "claim."' The
court finally relied on British American to find that individual "claims"
are distinguished based on their operative facts.'7 The court specifi-
cally noted that British American involved parallel suits presenting tort
and contract theories, as did Johns-Manville.'74 The court rejected
Johns-Manville's argument, based on Casman, that § 1500 does not
apply where the plaintiff cannot elect to pursue all theories in one
court, finding that the purpose of the statute was to prevent duplica-
tive suits regardless of the number of legal theories available to a
plaintiff.'75
Johns-Manville discredits the holdings of Prillman and Allied Materi-
als without expressly rejecting them. The court's treatment of PriUl-
man, however, is particularly unsatisfying. The court noted that
Prillman involved claims for money damages in both the district court
and the Court of Claims. 76 The court then distinguished the district
court's jurisdiction over monetary claims from the Court of Claims'
jurisdiction over monetary claims based on the $10,000 Little Tucker
Act cutoff.'7 Without further analysis, the court found: "Thus, ....
Prillman merely follow[s] the exception to section 1500 originating in
to an equitable adjustment. See id. at 1557.
170. See id. at 1559 (describing the factual overlap among the case in the Claims Court and
the suits filed in the Northern District of California and the Eastern District of virginia). Addi-
tionally, all claims maintained that the United States compelled compliance with its specifica-
tions, that the United States had control of the shipyard working conditions, and that the
United States established safety standards for the shipyards, but failed to follow them. See id.
171. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 12 CL. Ct. 197, 216-17 (1987) (denying jurisdiction
over a claim that was identical to one proceeding against the United States in another court),
af'd sub no.Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
172. SeeJohns-Manville, 855 F.2d at 1560 (noting that"claim" is difficult to define because it
has more than one meaning in law).
173. See id. at 1562-63 (noting that a distinct claim is not created if it originates under the
same set of facts as a preexisting claim, even when the new claim is based on a different legal
theory).
174. See id. (affirming that a "claim" is not distinguished by an original legal theory, but
rather by its grounding in different operative facts).
175. See id. at 1565 (stating that, despite § 1500's tendency to force a plaintiff to choose be-
tween two courts, a court may not "even in the interest ofjustice, extend its jurisdiction where
none exists").
176. See id. (noting that the plaintiff sought money damages in the Court of Claims and
both equitable and monetary relief in the district court).
177. See id. ("A district court's concurrent jurisdiction with the Claims Court is limited to
claims not exceeding $10,000.").
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Casman and do[es] not support any other exception to section
1500.)178
This reasoning simply does not hold water. The purpose of Cas-
man was to allow a plaintiff to pursue both equitable and monetary
claims where both could not be pursued in a single court. Prilman,
in contrast, was a rare case in which the plaintiff could pursue both
equitable relief and money damages in either court.'7 The Casman ra-
tionale did not apply and was not invoked by the court. The Prilman
court's express reason for refusing to dismiss the case before it was
that the plaintiff's Civil Rights Act claim did not fall within its juris-
diction and the plaintiff's Back Pay Act claim did not fall within the
district court's jurisdiction. 80 To the extent thatPrillman has any jus-
tification, it is that § 1500 applies only where the same court could
hear both claims, just as Johns-Manville argued.
The suggestion by the Johns-Manville court that Prillman turned on
the $10,000 limit on the damages available in the district court runs
contrary to the basic purpose of § 1500. If the cap on back pay re-
coverable in the district court in Prillman rendered the district court
claim different within the meaning of § 1500, then the $10,000 cap
on Little Tucker Act claims must have the same effect. Under this in-
terpretation a plaintiff could bring simultaneous Tucker Act and Lit-
tle Tucker Act suits in the CFC and a district court, respectively, with-
out regard to § 1500. That result would emasculate § 1500 by allow-
ing duplicative suits in precisely the situation the statute was intended
to address. Prillman cannot be interpreted to require such an unten-
able outcome. Notwithstanding the Johns-Manville court's efforts to
stuff Priliman into the Casman box, Prillman can be read only as the
plaintiff in Johns-Manville read it.
The Johns-Manville court evaded Allied Materials through more co-
gent, though no more convincing, reasoning. The court did not ana-
lyze Allied Materials on what it said, but on what it did not say:
It is not evident to us that Allied intended to extend the excep-
tion established in Casman to cover pending cases seeking mone-
tary relief so long as the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction over
the legal theories asserted in the district court. Allied does not state
the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief in the pending district court
cases. Nor does Allied discuss any of the precedents which would
need to be overruled or distinguished before reaching the holding
Johns-Manville argues Allied reaches. In summary, we find Johns-
178. Id.
179. See Prillman v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 677, 678 (1979) (noting that the plaintiff
sought monetary and equitable relief in both CFC and district court).
180. See id. at 679.
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Manville's reliance on Allied unfounded since it does not clearly
hold section 1500 is inapplicable where the pending suit seeks
monetary relief in both courts on the same operative facts. M
Although Allied Materials may not have "clearly held" that § 1500 is
inapplicable where suits seek the same relief on the same facts, it did
hold that the plaintiff, who was pursuing two suits for the same relief
on the same facts, was not barred from the Court of Claims by
§ 1500282
Although the court in Johns-Manville never discussed Hossein, its
holding and its revisionist treatment of Prilman and Allied Materials
suggest that the court intended to realign its § 1500 jurisprudence in
order to prevent an extension of the Hossein line of cases.'8 The
court seems to have desired a relatively bright line test under which a
"claim" is identified by reference to a set of operative facts and, in a
nod to Casman, to the type of relief sought, but not by the legal theo-
ries raised. '
The same year as Johns-Manville, however, the Federal Circuit revi-
talized Hossein in Boston Five Cents Savings Bank v. United States."" In
that case, the plaintiff brought a district court suit against the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") seeking a
declaratory judgment that an action contemplated by HUD would
constitute a breach of contract between it and HUD. 86 The district
court denied plaintiff leave to add a claim for damages to its com-
plaint.18 7 In response, the plaintiff brought suit in the Claims Court
and, on the same day, filed a new lawsuit in district court alleging the
same facts and seeking the same damages as sought in the Claims
Court.' " The Claims Court dismissed plaintiff's suit as barred by
§ 1500.'
181. Johns-Manvill4 855 F.2d at 1567.
182. SeeAllied Materials & Equip. Co. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 714,715 (1976) (refusing
to dismiss a Court of Claims suit, despite the existence of a simultaneous district court action,
because defendant could not have all of its legal claims heard in a single court).
183. SeeJohns-Manvill, 855 F.2d at 1566-67 (discussing the effect of AUied Materials and
Pri!lman on the properjurisdiction of federal courts).
184. See id. at 1559-62, 1567 (contending that a"claim" is defined by its operative facts, even
if those facts "support different legal theories which cannot all be brought in one court").
185. 864 F.2d 137 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
186. See id. at 138. The plaintiff was a mortgagee of a building, whose mortgage was guaran-
teed by HUD. Over the plaintiff's objection, HUD agreed to allow the mortgagor to convert
the building into cooperative housing. The plaintiff brought the declaratory judgment action
after the agreement, but prior to the conversion. See id.
187. See id. (denying motion to add a damages claim on the basis of inexcusable delay).
188. See id.
189. See Boston Five Cents Say. Bank v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 217, 219 (1988) (granting
the Government's motion to dismiss), rev', 864 F.2d 137 (Fed. Cir. 1988), overru/ed in part by
UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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The Federal Circuit reversed9' Citing Casman, the court held that
the original district court suit for declaratory judgment did not bar
Claims Court jurisdiction because it sought relief different from that
available in the Claims Court.9 The court held that the plaintiff's
subsequent unsuccessful attempt to add a damages claim did not bar
suit because the damages claim was not actually pending at the time
the Claims Court suit was filed.'92
Most significantly, the court held that, under Hossein, the second
district court action, filed contemporaneously with the Claims Court
action and seeking identical relief, did not bar jurisdiction in the
Claims Court.193 The court stated that:
Because the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction over Boston
Bank's monetary claim, it should not have dismissed the suit. Iden-
tical complaints were filed in the Claims Court and the district
court. Thus, only one legal theory forms the basis for the com-
plaints, and the Claims Court has sole jurisdiction over the claim.'9
Apparently, the Federal Circuit treated the case as if it were sitting
in review of both the Claims Court and district court actions, and
found the former to be the proper forum. But the Federal Circuit
had only the Claims Court action before it. It had no authority to ad-
judicate Boston Bank's standing in the district court. As a result, the
court ignored entirely the requirements of § 1500. The appropriate
remedy, in the event the district court concluded that it lacked juris-
diction, was transfer to the claims court.95 By allowing both suits to
remain pending, the court ignored § 1500's categorical withdrawal of
jurisdiction in the Claims Court where another suit is pending on the
same claim.
The confusion engendered by the cases applying Casman is height-
ened by the fact that, in almost every case, the Court of Claims has
negated the effect of Casman's § 1500 holding. In each instance, with
the exception of Allied Materials, the Court of Claims has elected to
stay an action there pending the resolution of district court proceed-
190. See Boston Five Cents, 864 F.2d at 137.
191. See id. at 139 (allowing suit in Claims Court to proceed because plaintiff's claims in
both courts sought different remedies). "Boston Bank's original suit in district court seeks only
equitable relief in the form of a declaratoryjudgment. The Claims Court suit, although involv-
ing the same operative facts and dispositive issues, requests only monetary relief." Id.
192. See id. (permitting Claims Court to have jurisdiction over plaintiff's money claim as it
was not pending in the district court at the time suit was filed in the Claims Court).
193. See id. at 139-40.
194. Id. at 140. Boston Five Cents in fact differs from Hossein because the two suits in Hossein
were brought under different legal theories, while the suits in Boston Five Cents were identical.
Nevertheless, the express reliance by the Boston Five Cents court on Hossein seems to resuscitate
Hossein after its near-death inJohns-Manvilk
195. See28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994).
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ings.19 None of these decisions have held that a stay was required, or
even contemplated, under § 1500.1 7 Instead, the decisions rest ex-
clusively on the courts' conclusions that § 1500 was not implicated at
all, On another common thread, the courts have invariably
couched their decisions to stay the Court of Claims proceeding in
terms of "comity" and "balancing competing interests."9 At the
same time, however, it cannot be ignored that the courts interpreting
Casman have accomplished the basic purpose of § 1500-preventing
duplicative suits-while finessing the most onerous aspects of the
statute.2
This review of the cases indicates that the Court of Claims and its
successors are uncomfortable with the attempt to define "claim" in
any terms other than operative facts. Yet when faced with cases in
which, for whatever reason, they believe the plaintiff should have a
cause of action in the Court of Claims, the courts have found ways to
avoid dismissal."' The result has been a crapshoot, in which two
plaintiffs in nearly identical procedural postures could meet entirely
conflicting results." In 1992, however, the Federal Circuit attempted
to put a stop to the confusion and bring some much needed coher-
ence to its § 1500jurisprudence. 3
196. See id. (suspending proceedings pending outcome of the district court suit); see also
Priliman v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 677, 679 (1979); Hossein v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 727,
729 (1978); City of Santa Clara v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 890, 89394 (1977).
197. See Boston Five Cents, 864 F.2d at 140 (using a balancing test to justify a suspension of
proceedings); Prillman, 220 Ct. Cl. at 679 (justifying a stay on the basis that district court pro-
ceedings were already underway); Hossein, 218 Ct. CI. at 729 (defending a suspension of pro-
ceedings for reasons of "comity" and the need to avoid "piecemeal litigation"); City of Santa
Clara, 215 Ct. CL. at 893 (staying proceedings for reasons of"comity, justice [and] judicial ad-
ministration").
198. See Boston Five Cents, 864 F.2d at 139 (ruling that § 1500 did not apply at all); see also
Pri/!man, 220 Ct. Cl. at 678 (same); Hossein, 218 Ct. Cl. at 728-29; Santa Clara, 215 CL Cl. at 891.
199. See Boston Five Cents, 864 F.2d at 140 (holding that the "balancing of competing inter-
ests" dictates stay of Claims Court action); Pri/!man, 220 Ct. CL. at 679 (finding that"it would be
inappropriate to litigate at the same time in two different courts, on the identical issues");
Hossein, 218 Ct. CI. at 729 (suspending Court of Claims case for"reasons of comity and avoid-
ance of piecemeal litigation"); Santa Clara, 215 Ct. Cl. at 891 (staying proceedings due to
"unique circumstances").
200. But see 139 CONG. REc. S10,383-84 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Heflin)
(contending that § 1500 has increased duplicative suits); Peabody et al., supra note 141, at 97
n.5 (1994) (discussing the effect of § 1500); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 599 (arguing that the
volume of litigation would be less without § 1500).
201. See Boston Five Cents, 864 F.2d at 140 (calling on a balancing test to avoid dismissal);
Pril!man, 220 Ct. Cl. at 679 (justifying its failure to dismiss on grounds that district court pro-
ceedings were already "well underway" and the plaintiff, upon favorable conclusion of those
proceedings, could return and seek further damages in the Court of Claims); Hossein, 218 Ct.
CI. at 729 (defending its decision to stay on grounds of "comity" and the need to avoid
"piecemeal litigation").
202. Compare Hossein, 218 Ct. Cl. at 729 (retaining jurisdiction of one of plaintiffs claims
pending outcome of district court case), with Johns-Manville, 855 F.2d 1556, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (affirming Claims Court's dismissal of all plaintiffs claims).
203. See UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1992), af'd sub
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B. UNR/Keene and Recent Attempts at Consistency
In UNR Industries, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit under-
took a comprehensive overhaul of its § 1500jurisprudence." A suc-
cessor case to Johns-Manville, UNiR involved three asbestos companies
that were sued in federal court for personal injuries resulting from
exposure to asbestos.' In district court, the companies filed third-
party complaints against the United States seeking contribution or
indemnification for adverse judgments resulting from the govern-
ment specifications requiring the use of asbestos.' In addition, one
of the companies, Keene Corporation, filed an FTCA suit against the
Government in another district court.207 While their district court
claims were pending, the companies also brought suit against the
United States in the Claims Court for breach of contract and breach
of warranty.208  Subsequently, the suits in the district courts were
dropped.2 9 Not long after, the Claims Court also dismissed the com-
plaints before it based on § 1500, finding a "homogeneity of opera-
tive facts" in the district court and Claims Court actions.2'0
On appeal, the Federal Circuit faced two fairly straightforward is-
sues: (1) whether § 1500 applies when the district court complaint is
dismissed prior to dismissal by the the Claims Court, and (2) whether
a "claim" under § 1500 is identified on the basis of operative facts. 1
In fact, British American had already effectively answered both ques-
tions. British American introduced the operative facts test, and also
held that a claim is barred by § 1500 if another suit is pending at the
time the claim is filed in the Court of Claims, irrespective of when
nom. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993) (addressing inconsistencies within
§ 1500's jurisprudence, the court attempted to resolve jurisdictional issues sua sponte).
204. See id.
205. See id. at 1015.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 1016.
208. See id. at 1015-16.
209. See id. at 1015 (explaining that § 1500 denies the U.S. Claims Court jurisdiction over
claims of plaintiffs who have any suit or process against the U.S. pending in any other court).
210. Keene Corp. v. United States, 17 C1. Ct. 146, 156 (1989), af/'d sub nom. UNR Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and afjd sub nom. Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993).
211. See UNR, 962 F.2d at 1016 (discussing the Claims Court's association of"claim" with the
.operative facts" standard). These two issues were the only ones presented by the facts before
the court. The Federal Circuit, however, asked the parties to address a broader range of issues
in its order accepting rehearing, including whether the Claims Court is divested ofjurisdiction
if the plaintiff subsequently files suit in district court on the same claim and whether a suit is
.pending" within the meaning of § 1500 if a petition for writ of certiorari is pending. See id. at
1017.
212. See British Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 438, 440-41 (1939) (holding
that a suit's "dismissal on the merits" in one court would preclude another court's jurisdiction
under § 1500, and that the meaning of "claim" has no "reference to the legal theory upon
which a claimant seeks to enforce his demand").
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the Court of Claims decides the § 1500 issue. 2' 3 Despite subsequent
inconsistent caselaw, neither aspect of the British American decision
had been overruled.1 4 Nevertheless, the court, clearly eager to set its
§ 1500 precedent straight, strayed far from the facts of the instant
215
case to address a variety of § 1500 issues.
As to the initial issue regarding the timing of claims in multiple
courts, UNR reaffirmed the holding of British American.2 6 At the same
time, UNR also overruled Brown v. United States,21 7 a case in which the
Court of Claims found that a suit was not barred when an identical
district court action had been dismissed subsequent to the filing of
the Court of Claims action.2 8 The court then expanded its discussion
to include the line of cases in which the Court of Claims stayed claims
before it, pending resolution of district court proceedings, and then
reinstated those claims upon dismissal by the district courts.29 Hav-
ing expressly overruled Brown, the court unflinchingly announced
that it was also overruling "cases like Casman, Hossein, and Boston Five
Cents, which declined to dismiss complaints in the Claims Court when
the same claim was the basis for a case pending in district court."2°
Finally, the court overruled Tecon Engineers, Inc. v. United States,22' a
case in which the Court of Claims retained jurisdiction when a dis-
trict court action was filed after the commencement of the Court of
213. See id. (holding that the plaintiff's attempt to manipulate the same set of facts so as to
allege a cause of action in both tort and contract "does not obscure the unity or sameness of
the claim").
214. See supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text (analyzing British Am. Tobacco and its
progeny).
215. With respect to the timing issue alone, the court issued this holding:
[W]e hold today that in accordance with the words, meaning, and intent of section
1500: 1) if the same claim is pending in another court at the time the complaint is
filed in the [Court of Federal Claims], the [Court of Federal Claims] has no jurisdic-
tion, regardless of when an objection is raised or acted on; 2) if the same claim is filed
in another court after the complaint is filed in the [Court of Federal Claims], the
[Court of Federal Claims] is by that action divested ofjurisdiction, regardless of when
the court memorializes the fact by order of dismissal; and 3) if the same claim has
been finally disposed of by another court before the complaint is filed in the [Court
of Federal Claims], ordinary rules of resjudicata and available defenses apply.
UN, 962 F.2d at 1021.
216. See id. "There is nothing in section 1500 to suggest a free floating jurisdictional bar
that attaches only when the government files a motion to dismiss or, worse, when the court gets
around to acting on it. Jurisdiction cannot be bestowed by the parties." Id.
217. 175 Ct. Cl. 343 (1966), overruled by Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993).
218. See id. at 348 ("Once [a] claim has been rejected by [another] court for lack ofjurisdic-
tion, there is no basis in the policy or wording of the statute for dismissal of the claim pending
here.").
219. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text (discussing the practice of staying a
Court of Claims suit when a district court action is based on the same operative facts).
220. UMR, 962 F.2d at 1022 n.3 (citations omitted).
221. 343 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965), overrued by UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d
1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Claims action.2 In justification of its broad holding, despite the ab-
sence of a similarly broad controversy, the court declared, " [w] e are
today undertaking a comprehensive effort to set out the proper in-
terpretation of a jurisdictional statute, a matter that does not require
a pointed dispute between parties. '' 2
Next, the court addressed the definition of "claim." Again, with
relative ease, the court resolved the issue before it by reaffirming the
series of cases holding that "claims" under § 1500 are determined
with reference to operative facts.224 The court went on to address one
appellant's argument that its claims were distinct because the relief
sought in its FTCA district court action differed from that sought in
its Claims Court action.m The court denied this argument based on
its overruling of Casman, definitively noting that "Casman and its
progeny are no longer valid."
2 2 6
In sum, the UNR court stated the following holdings:
" Jurisdiction in the CFC is determined at the time of filing.
Thus, if a district court suit for the same claim is pending on
the date of filing in the CFC, the CFC suit is barred, even if the
district court action is subsequently dismissed. 7
• If the same claim is pending in the district court and the CFC,
the CFC may not avoid the application of § 1500 by staying the
matter before it.
* The CFC is divested ofjurisdiction if, after bringing suit in the
CFC, the plaintiff files a second suit for the same claim in dis-
trict court.m
* A claim is "pending" for § 1500 purposes if it is on appeal.
Thus, a CFC suit is barred if the plaintiff is in the process of
222. See id. at 949 (ruling that the Court of Claims does not relinquish jurisdiction upon
filing of a subsequent district court claim).
223. UNR, 962 F.2d at 1023. The court continued:
Courts are obliged to resolve jurisdictional questions on their own even if parties do
not raise them. In the course of this interpretative effort, if prior cases are seen as in-
consistent, it is incumbent on the court to acknowledge their nonviability. For that
reason we revisit Tecon, an aberrational case which stands astride the path to a proper
interpretation of section 1500 as it pertains to a post Claims Court filing in another
court.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
224. See id. at 1024 (holding that legal theories are an improper basis for defining "claim*
(citing British Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. CI. 438, 440 (1939))); see also Los Ange-
les Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 236, 238 (Ct. Cl. 1957)
(holding that factual content, not legal theories, is the key element of a § 1500 "claim").
225. See UNR 962 F.2d at 1024.
226. See id. at 1025.
227. See id. at 1021.
228. Seeid. at 1022.
229. See id.
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appealing a district court suit on the same claim.m
* The term "claim" refers to operative facts, not to legal theory.
23
'
* A claim is not made different if it seeks different relief.
If taken at face value, UNR would have overruled Casman, Tecon,
Brown, Hossein, Prillman, Allied Materials, Santa Clara, and Boston Five
Cents. UNR has not been taken at face value.
The plaintiffs appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
under the case name Keene Corp. v. United States.2 Justice Souter's
sober opinion for the majority narrowed some of the Federal Cir-
cuit's excesses. The majority summarily affirmed the Federal Cir-
cuit's holding that jurisdiction under § 1500 is determined at the
time of the filing of the complaint.m The Court further found that
subject-matter jurisdiction normally turns on the facts upon filing
and that § 1500 contains no language suggesting a deviation from
that rule.m In so deciding, the Court defanged much of the
"holding" of UNR
We do not decide whether the statute also continues to bar a plain-
tiff from prosecuting a claim in the Court of Federal Claims while
he has pending a later-filed suit in another court "for or in respect
to" the same claim.... As the dissenting judge noted below, this
case does not raise that issue.2
The Court then delved deeper to decide when two actions involve
the same "claim." 7 It first reviewed the case law and concluded that
the statute and its predecessors had traditionally and correctly been
interpreted to bar as duplicative claims based on the same operative
facts.m
These precedents demonstrate that under the immediate prede-
cessor of § 1500, the comparison of the two cases for purposes of
possible dismissal would turn on whether the plaintiffs other suit
was based on substantially the same operative facts as the Court of
Claims action, at least if there was some overlap in the relief re-
quested.m
230. Seeid.at 1024.
231. See id. at 1023.
232. See id. at 1024-25.
233. 508 U.S. 200 (1993).
234. See id. at 207.
235. See id. at 207-08.
236. Id. at 209 n.4 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed the overruling of
Brown and Hossein, noting that the holdings in those cases could not be squared with its ruling
thatjurisdiction is determined at the time of filing. See id. at 217 n.12.
237. See id. at 212-13.
238. See id.
239. Id.
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The Court dismissed the Federal Circuit's attempt to eradicate the
exceptions based on the relief requested, noting that "[b]ecause the
issue is not presented on the facts of this case, we need not decide
whether two actions based on the same operative facts, but seeking
completely different relief, would implicate § 1500. "240
The decision upheld, however, the Federal Circuit's rejection of
the Hossein line of cases. The Supreme Court held that a difference
in legal theories does not make the claims different for purposes of
§ 1500.241 Responding to Keene's argument that Casman and Allied
Materials applied a legal theories test, the Court reprised the Johns-
Manville strategy of selective interpretation. CitingJohns-Manville and
Boston Five Cents, the Court found that Casman had been limited to
cases in which the plaintiff seeks different relief in the two courts.4 2
The Court echoed Johns-Manville in the following declaration:
Although it is not clear whether the plaintiff in Allied Materials was
seeking completely different relief in the District Court, the Court
of Claims simply applied Casman without much explanation. Nei-
ther Casman nor Allied Materials discussed, much less purported to
overrule, British American Tobacco Co. v. United States, a case that un-S 243
doubtedly is well established.
Although the Supreme Court in Keene creatively interpreted Brown
and Hossein, it expressly overruled those cases. According to the
Court, Brown and Hossein held that § 1500 "does not apply after dis-
missal of an earlier filed District Court suit brought in derogation of
the Court of Federal Claims's exclusive jurisdiction.244 The Court
noted that "Brown and Hossein do not survive our ruling today, for
they ignored the time-of-filing rule" which determines jurisdiction at
the time the CFC action is filed.2  In reality, Brown and Hossein did
not rely on the fact that the district court dismissed the action. The
cases simply held that § 1500 does not apply where the CFC is the
proper and exclusive forum for the legal theory pleaded in district
court.2 4 6 Still, Keene probably effectively overrules those cases.
24 7
240. Id. at 212 n.6.
241. See id. at 216-17.
242. See id. at 214 n.9.
243. Id. (internal citations omitted).
244. Id. at 216.
245. See id. at 217 n.12.
246. See Brown v. United States, 358 F.2d 1002, 1004-05 (1966) (holding that since there is
no appeal from the district court's ruling and the appeals' period has expired, § 1500 does not
require the court to deprive plaintiffs' only forum remaining to test their demand of compen-
sation); Hossein v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 727, 728-29 (1978) (refusing to dismiss section
1500 count because of the court's exclusive jurisdiction over the amount of damages even
when the same claim was pending in federal district court), overruled by UNR Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508
U.S. 200 (1993).
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Despite these holdings, the Supreme Court left much of the pre-
UNR ambiguity intact. The Court stated that "[i]n applying § 1500 to
the facts of this case, we find it unnecessary to consider, much less
repudiate, the 'judicially created exceptions' to § 1500 found in Tecon
Engineers, Casman, and Boston Five."248 Thus, it is not clear whether a
claim filed in district court after the same claim is filed in the CFC will
divest the CFC of jurisdiction.249 Because Casman apparently is still
valid, claims may be considered different if they seek different re-
lief.m Moreover, Boston Five Cents, a case in which the plaintiff was al-
lowed to pursue district court and CFC claims based on the same op-
erative facts and seeking the same relief, still stands.25'
Of the six holdings announced by the Federal Circuit in UNR, the
Supreme Court in Keene conclusively affirmed the first, holding that
jurisdiction in the CFC is always determined at the time of filing.s
The Court ostensibly affirmed the second and fifth as well, holding
that the CFC may not stay a case pending resolution of the district
court action and that "claims" are identified on the basis of operative
facts.2 The Court avoided the other three, which had held that the
CFC is divested ofjurisdiction by a later-filed district court suit, that a
claim is "pending" if a petition for certiorari is pending, and that
claims are not made different if they seek different relief.'
247. See Keene, 508 U.S. at 215 (noting that court of appeals announced overruling of Brown
and Hossein).
248. Id. at 216. The Supreme Court's implication that the Federal Circuit had no business
ruling on these three cases was somewhat circuitous. Keene apparently did not argue in its ap-
peal that those cases were improperly or ineffectively overruled. Instead, it argued that the
overruling of those cases was a change in the law necessary for the Federal Circuit to reach the
holding it reached. See id. at 215. Keene then argued that such a change in the law should only
be applied prospectively, and therefore could not apply to defeat Keene's claims. See id. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument by finding that the overruling of those cases was not
essential to the Federal Circuit's holding because the cases were not applicable to Keene's facts.
See id. at 216-17.
249. But see Hardwick Bros. Co. II v. United States, 72 F.3d 883, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(holding that a later-filed district court action does not divest CFC of jurisdiction if properly
established).
250. See Dico, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1199, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing court's deci-
sion in Loveladies as keeping the Casman decision intact).
251. See George W. Miller &Jonathan L. Abram, A Survey of Recent Takings Cases in the Court
of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 863, 896 n.269
(1993) (explaining how Keeneleft Boston Five Cents intact despite its overruling by UNR).
252. SeeKene 508 U.S. at 208-09.
253. See Miller & Abram, supra note 251, at 896 n.269. The Court left some doubt as to
these latter holdings by leaving Boston Five Cents intact. The court in Boston Five Cents had stayed
a Claims Court action on the ground that the identical claims pending before the district court
were improperly before that court. See Boston Five Cents Say. Bank v. United States, 864 F.2d
137, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1988), overruled by UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
254. See Keene, 508 U.S. at 215-16 (finding it "unnecessary to consider, much less repudiate,
the 'judicially created exceptions' to § 1500").
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The year after the decision in Keene, the Federal Circuit had a
chance to address directly the Casman issue and some of the confu-
sion left by UNR and Keene. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United Stater
was a regulatory takings case involving the denial of a wetlands devel-
opment permit.6 The property owner, Loveladies, had first filed suit
in federal district court challenging the validity of the denial under
the APA.2 7 The trial court denied the relief requested, and while an
appeal to the Third Circuit was pending,m Loveladies filed suit in the
CFC seeking compensation for the taking of Loveladies' private
property.29 The CFC heard the case, found in favor of Loveladies,
and awarded damages. 260 The government appealed, and while the
appeal was pending, the Federal Circuit decided UNR.2 6' The gov-
ernment then moved to vacate the judgment for Loveladies on juris-
dictional grounds, arguing that the two claims were the same because
they were based on the same operative facts, notwithstanding the fact
that the actions sought different remedies.62
Reaching its decision after the Supreme Court's decision in Keene,
the Federal Circuit denied the government's motion to vacate and
affirmed the judgment for Loveladies. 26 The court relied on the Su-
preme Court's language disavowing UNR as it applied to Casman and
the cases holding that different claims exist where one claim is for
money damages and the other is for specific relief.2" Expressly reaf-
firming Casman, the Federal Circuit in Loveladies held that a congru-
ity of operative facts defeats jurisdiction only where two claims seek
money damages.26 "For the Court of Federal Claims to be precluded
from hearing a claim under § 1500, the claim pending in another
court must arise from the same operative facts, and must seek the same
relief."26
255. 27 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
256. See id. at 1547.
257. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. Baldwin, Civ. No. 82-1948, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18716
(D.N.J. Mar. 12, 1984) (affirming denial of permit), affid, 751 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1984).
258. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. Baldwin, 751 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming district
court without decision).
259. See Loveladies v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 153 (1990) (holding that action amounted to
taking of plaintiff's property), aftd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
260. See id. at 161 (awarding damages of $2,658,000).
261. UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992),aff'd sub fora. Keene
Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993).
262. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
263. See id. at 1556.
264. See id. at 1549.
265. See id. at 1550-51 ("Casman and its progeny reflect a carefully considered interpreta-
tion of the statutory term 'claims,' a term undefined in the statute and subject to conflicting
views as to its meaning.").
266. Id. at 1551 (emphasis added).
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Thus, UNR/Keene and Loveladies have brought some degree of clar-
ity to the morass of § 1500 interpretations. It seems that a firm test of
"claim" has been established: a claim is the same if it is based on the
same operative facts and seeks the same relief.2 7 Combining this rule
and the other holdings in the cases, the following rule ostensibly has
been established: a suit in the CFC is barred if the plaintiff has pend-
ing at the time that suit is filed a suit in a district court or court of
appeals based on the same operative facts and seeking the same re-
lief, regardless of the legal theories pleaded.2 68 Despite the seeming
clarity of this rule, confusion still remains due to the difficulty of
identifying the same "relief" in light of recent cases on "equitable"
claims for monetary relief.2 Two cases, Bowen v. Massachusetts 0 and
Far West Federal Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision,2 ' raise the question
of whether claims are the same under § 1500 where one seeks breach
of contract money damages and the other seeks monetary relief
based on equitable theories, such as restitution. The next section
addresses this issue.
III. THE BOWEN-CASMANDILEMMA AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES
The Casman exception to the operative facts test, as that exception
has been developed, holds that § 1500 does not apply where two suits
based on the same operative facts seek different relief 2 While the
exception creates ambiguity as to the meaning of the term "claim" in
§ 1500, embedded in the exception is a second ambiguity, as to the
meaning of the term "relief.,27s If claims are different when they seek
different relief, then there must be a way to identify different reliefs.
Casman begged the question by holding that the relief is different if it
is not available in both forums.274 That test would suffice if a clear di-
viding line could be drawn between the types of relief available in dis-
trict courts and in the CFC. When Casman was decided, such a line
probably existed. 5 It does not today.
267. See id. at 1548-51 (tracing caselaw development of term "claim" as used in § 1500).
268. See id.
269. See infra Part III and accompanying text (discussing Bowen-Casman dilemma and diffi-
culty of applying § 1500 to claims based on the same operative facts that seek different relief).
270. 487 U.S. 879 (1987).
271. 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
272. See infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text (listing cases that have developed the
Casman exception).
273. See Casman v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647, 649-50 (1956) (stating that claim and re-
lief sought under § 1500 "are entirely different").
274. See id. (holding § 1500 inapplicable where plaintiff sought reinstatement available only
in district court and back pay available only in CFC).
275. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (explaining how Bowen blurred the clear
distinct line between relief in district courts and relief in CFC).
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A. The Potential Impact ofBowen
The Supreme Court in Bowen v. Massachusetts 7 6 blurred the lines
dividing the relief available in district courts and the CFC. As a result
of Bowen, both district courts and the CFC have some degree ofjuris-
diction over suits for monetary relief based on non-tort obligations.
2
"
Although the Bowen Court suggested that Massachusetts may not have
been able to pursue its claims in the CFC in that case,278 it is not hard
to imagine a case in which an "equitable" action for restitution of
monies due could be joined with a contract claim for money dam-
ages. Indeed, Far West Federal Bank v. United States2 presents such a
case. The plaintiff in Far West almost certainly could have sued the
United States in the CFC for damages resulting from the breaches of
contract by FDIC and OTS.2 8 In the wake of Bowen, Casman's meth-
odology falls short, because at least one type of monetary relief-
restitution for breach of contract-is available in both district courts
and the CFC based on the same operative facts.
The cases developing and interpreting the Casman exception have
concentrated more than Casman did on the meaning of "different re-
lief." They generally have treated Casman as a case holding that
claims are different under § 1500 where one claim seeks specific re-
lief and the other seeks money damages.281 Typically, the Casman ex-
ception has been applied in cases where the plaintiff in the CFC has a
claim in district court based on the same wrong but seeking an in-
junction,2 2 a declaratoryjudgment,2 3 or the reversal of administrative
agency action.
276. 487 U.S. 879 (1987).
277. See id. at 911-12.
278. See id. at 905-07 (noting in dicta that CFC may not have jurisdiction to hear claims aris-
ing under Medicaid Act).
279. Far West Fed. Bank v. United States, 930 F.2d 883, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that
plaintiff alleging breach of contract with regulatory agency may sue in district court for mone-
tary restitution).
280. See id. at 888 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1), the Tucker Act, which grants the CFCju-
risdiction over contractual claims for money damages in claims against the government). In
many Winstar type cases alleging facts similar to Far West, the plaintiffs initially filed suit in dis-
trict court seeking injunctions, and then subsequently filed CFC suits on the same facts for
money damages. Most of those cases are pending at the writing of this article.
281. See id. Casman was not so precise in its terminology. The court held simply that sec-
tion 1500 did not apply where the plaintiff could not elect to pursue his "claims" in either fo-
rum. SeeCasman v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647, 650 (1956).
282. See City of Santa Clara v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 890, 891 (1977) (allowing stay of
CFC suit for money damages while plaintiff pursued district court suit for injunction).
283. See Boston Five Cents Say. Bank v. United States, 864 F.2d 137, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(holding, based on Casman, that plaintiff may maintain district court suit for declaratory relief
and simultaneous CFC suit for money damages).
284. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1548 (1994) (holding CFC
has jurisdiction over takings claim where plaintiff is also prosecuting district court suit seeking
review of agency action).
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Yet Bowen plays havoc with this "specific relief' distinction. In find-
ingjurisdiction in the district court, the Supreme Court in Bowen re-
lied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff couched its claims in terms
of specific relief.2 The Supreme Court held that a suit seeking resti-
tution of money wrongfully withheld is a suit seeking specific relief.
2
'
If the Casman cases are read to distinguish between CFC suits for
money damages and district court suits seeking specific relief, Bowen
falls squarely within the Casman exception.
Unless Bowen is treated as an anomaly and discarded, which seems
unlikely in light of Far West, eventually a plaintiff will file correspond-
ing suits in district court seeking the specific remedy of monetary res-
titution and in the CFC seeking money damages for breach of con-
tract. The government will move to dismiss the CFC action under
§ 1500, and a court will face the Bowen-Casman dilemma. It will have
several options: (1) it can treat Bowen cases as outside the scope of
§ 1500 under Casman, and allow simultaneous claims to proceed;
(2) it can distinguish Bowen from Casman and apply § 1500, dismiss-
ing the CFC action; (3) it can follow UNR by eliminating the Casman
exception entirely; or (4) it can find a hybrid solution. 7 None of
these options is entirely satisfactory.
B. Possible Responses to the Bowen-Casman Problem
1. Options within the existing precedent
The first option for a court addressing the Bowen-Casman issue is to
fit Bowen under the Casman exception by holding that any suit seek-
ing specific relief in a district court falls outside the scope of § 1500,
and in such a situation a CFC suit may be pursued simultaneously on
the same operative facts. This option is probably unacceptable be-
cause it would destroy the very purpose of § 1500-to prevent dupli-
cative lawsuits. 2s It would allow a plaintiff to sue a government
285. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1987) (holding that suit seeking pay-
ment of funds under Medicare Act is suit seeking specific relief).
286. S&e id.
287. In all likelihood, the CFC or the Federal Circuit, or both, will face this issue, as section
1500 normally is applied by those courts. It should be noted, however, that § 1500 also has
been held to apply to district court claims brought under the Little Tucker Act. See Shapiro v.
United States, 168 F.2d 625, 626 (3d Cir. 1948); Ohio Locomotive Crane Co. v. Denman, 73
F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1934) (holding, under Tucker Act and § 1500, that taxpayer could elect
whether he wanted judgment against administrator of deceased collector or United States).
Accordingly, a district court could decide to decline jurisdiction based on § 1500 in a Little
Tucker Act suit.
288. SeeKeene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 206 (1993) (citing Abandoned Property
Collection Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820 (1863)); Schwartz,supra note 12, at 571-80 (tracing history
and purpose of§ 1500 to show that duplication of lawsuits prompted congressional legislation).
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agency in district court, under the agency's "sue and be sued" power,
for breach of contract seeking the specific remedy of restitution,
while at the same time suing the United States in the CFC for the
same breach but seeking the remedy of money damages. That result
would leave § 1500 arbitrary and irrational-a plaintiff could notjoin
all his legal theories in one case, but he could sue twice based on the
same legal theory. A court almost certainly would find a way to avoid
such an outcome.
The easiest way to avoid such an irrational result while keeping the
basic Casman exception alive is to distinguish Bowen from Casman.
The obvious way to distinguish Bowen is to find that the Casman ex-
ception applies only where the district court suit seeks something
other than monetary payment.2 9 The problem with drawing such a
distinction is that the practical outcome of many injunctions and de-
claratory judgments is a ruling that one party must take or refrain
from taking action that will result, either directly or indirectly, in a
monetary payment to the other party2" That was the situation in Bos-
ton Five Cents Savings Bank v. United States,2' which held that the Cas-
man exception applies to declaratory judgments.n A victory in the
district court declaratory judgment action would have entitled the
plaintiff to the same recovery in the district court as that available in
the Claims Court for money damages.23 Thus, although it is theo-
retically defensible, the option of applying § 1500 whenever a mone-
tary payment is sought has some of the arbitrariness of squeezing
Bowen into the Casman category.
A third option is to follow UNR and overrule the entire Casman
line.Y A court could simply hold that the sole test for whether claims
are the same under § 1500 is the operative facts test; 5 § 1500 was in-
tended to require an election and that election includes the election
of remedies.26 A court might conclude that the particular injustice
289. SeeAlaska v. United States, 32 Fed. CI. 689, 696-97 (1995) (holding that action for de-
claratory and injunctive relief is different than action for damages).
290. But see Marks v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 387, 400 (1995) (determining that similar
phrases requesting costs and other appropriate relief in district court action for declaratory and
injunctive relief were distinguishable from Fifth Amendment takings claim in CFC).
291. 864 F.2d 137 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
292. See id. at 139.
293. See id. at 138.
294. See UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding
that "Casm an and its progeny are no longer valid").
295. See Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(construing § 1500's use of the term "claim" to refer to operative facts rather than legal theo-
ries).
296. See Brown v. United States, 358 F.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ("Section 1500 was de-
signed to require an election between two forums both of which could presumably grant the
same type of relief.").
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encountered in Casman was rectified by Congress in its amendment
to the Tucker Act allowing certain limited equitable remedies in the
CFC?. 7 If Congress decides that plaintiffs should have even greater
leeway to pursue both equitable remedies and money damages, it has
the power to amend the Tucker Act further. Although this option
has some attraction, if for no other reason than that it offers coher-
ence, it seems precluded by Loveladiesm at least until the Supreme
Court chooses to visit the issue.
A court looking to keep all parties happy and to follow a precedent
might rely on City of Santa Clara v. United States.2 Santa Clara ad-
dressed a situation very similar to that in Bowen. A non-federal gov-
ernment entity-the state of Massachusetts in Bowen and in Santa
Clara, the city of Santa Clara-brought suit in district court alleging
that an arm of the federal government had improperly withheld a
benefit due the local government.3 In contrast to the plaintiffs in
Bowen, the city of Santa Clara pursued claims in both the district
court and the Court of Claims." The Court of Claims held that
§ 1500 did not apply because the district court suit sought equitable
remedies?3' Recognizing that the district court suit could result in an
identical recovery to the one sought in the Court of Claims, the
Court of Claims stayed its suit during the pendency of the district
court suit.30
Santa Clara is easily applied to Bowen. A court addressing the effect
of § 1500 in a Bowen situation could dodge the issue by relying on
Santa Clara to allow the plaintiff to "maintain" both suits, while stay-
ing one. 4 The problem with this solution is that the Supreme Court
implicitly rejected the Santa Clara approach in Keene Corp. v. United
States.35 The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction under § 1500 is
determined at the time the CFC action is filed.m The Court over-
ruled Brown and Hossein, cases that stayed Court of Claims cases while
parallel district court suits proceeded, on the ground that they
297. See28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(27) (1994).
298. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(construing § 1500 as barring claim in Court of Federal Claims only if the claim is in another
court and based on same operative facts and requesting same relief).
299. 215 Ct. Cl. 890 (1977).
300. Id. at 892.
301. See id.
302. See id. at 893.
303. See id. at 893-94.
304. See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Brief Reply Brief, Keene Corp. v. United States, 1993 WL
290110, at *13 (Feb. 17, 1993) (arguing that the purpose of § 1500-avoiding"improperly du-
plicative simultaneous litigation--is not compromised by allowing the Court of Federal Claims
to stay its proceedings while the plaintiff maintains the district court suit).
305. 508 U.S. 200 (1993).
306. See id at 207.
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"ignored the time-of-filing rule." ' 7 Although the decision in Keene is
not entirely clear, the Supreme Court apparently held that the CFC
has no power over the parties if at the time the case is filed the same
claim is pending in a district court," and so it cannot grant a stay of
the action. At a minimum, the Santa Clara approach is suspect.
The potential problem created by Bowen and Casman cannot be re-
solved satisfactorily within the existing precedent. The jurisdictional
grants providing for suit against the federal government simply can-
not be reconciled with § 1500 as it has been interpreted.m The ab-
sence of an easy way out may prove fortuitous, though. The fact that
the Bowen-Casman problem stems from basic contradictions within
the U.S. Code and the relevant caselaw suggests that the problem
should be resolved at a more fundamental level.10 The lack of a clear
answer could provoke a court to take a more daring approach, one
that could generate benefits for many plaintiffs aggrieved by gov-
ernment action, based on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction' '
2. The pendent jurisdiction option
Pendent jurisdiction gives district courts jurisdiction beyond that
prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332 in cases where those stat-
utes confer partial jurisdiction.1 2 The Tucker Act is simply another
section of the Judicial Code that allocates jurisdiction over certain
causes of action to certain federal courts, apparently on an equal
307. Id. at 217 n.12.
308. See Jurisdiction--Court of Federal Claims--Claim Pending in Another Court, 9 FED.
LITIGATOR 266, 268 (1994) (stating that Keene requires Court of Federal Claims to dismiss a case
for want of jurisdiction where similar relief is sought in another court); see also Virginia S. Al-
brecht, Regulating Takings & Wetlands: What Are the Constitutional Limits?, SB 14 ALI-ABA 531
(1996) (noting that Supreme Court in Keene held that § 1500 precludes Court of Federal
Claims from exercising jurisdiction if the plaintiff contemporaneously seeks similar relief in
another court).
309. SeePeabody et al., supra note 141, at 98 (calling the inconsistent application of§ 1500 a
"minefield of seemingly arbitrary rules").
310. See id. at 107 (advocating that Congress repeal § 1500).
311. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, § 5.4 (describing pendent and ancillary jurisdiction).
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear claims based solely on state
law, where the parties are not diverse, where the state law claims are intertwined with federal
claims properly before the court. See id. § 5.4.2. The Supreme Court gave the doctrine its cur-
rent formulation in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The Court stated:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim
"arising under" [federal law] ... and the relationship between that claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but
one constitutional "case" .... The state and federal claims must derive from a com-
mon nucleus of operative fact.
Id. at 725. The Court noted that whether to accept pendent jurisdiction is a matter within the
discretion of the district court, and advised that courts should decline jurisdiction if the state
law claims "substantially predominate." Id. at 726.
312. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, § 5.4 (discussing the application of pendent and ancil-
laryjurisdiction).
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footing with those statutes."31 None of the statutes contains language
suggesting that it is entitled to a stricter interpretation than the oth-
ers, but courts generally have refused to allow the jurisdictional lee-
way contemplated by pendent jurisdiction to creep into the Tucker
Act.
314
Yet in Far West Federal Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 5 the Fed-
eral Circuit set a precedent for limited pendent jurisdiction in suits
against the federal government.316 Far West was a Winstar-type case in
which the plaintiff sued the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion ("OTS") and the FDIC in district court for breach of contract,
seeking both an injunction barring further breach and restitution of
funds invested pursuant to the contract at issue. 17 OTS argued that
the claim for restitution was a disguised contract claim for money
damages available only in the CFC against the United States because
, ,~ 318OTS's "sue and be sued" clause excluded suits for money damages.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, relying on the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction.3 9 The court found a Supreme Court policy
favoring unitary resolution of disputes with the government in the
recent decision in United States v. Hohi,20 in which the Supreme
Court held that a single court of appeals could hear both an FTCA
appeal and a Little Tucker Act appeal normally appealable only to
the Federal Circuit.3 " Based on Hohri, the Federal Circuit in Far West
found that "[t]o assign to different courts the determination of vari-
ous aspects of the same complex transaction; to redevelop the identi-
313. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 395 § 1, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (1994)) (defining contract claims against government). See Dennis M. Garvis, If at First
You Don't Succeed... : An Alternative Remedy After Nordic Village, 66 AM. BANKR. LJ. 423, 431
(1992) (discussing Tucker Act as a solely jurisdictional statute, requiring an additional federal
law to conferjurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims).
314. See Mega Constr. Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 396, 477 (1993) (stating that Tucker
Act expressly excludes tort claims against the government in Court of Federal Claims); Free v.
United States, 17 CI. Ct. 488, 495 (1989) (refusing to extend Tucker Act jurisdiction to include
Fifth Amendment takings claim because "constitutional provision does not in itself obligate the
federal government to pay money damages"). The Federal Circuit's decision in UNRis a good
example of the rigidity ascribed to Tucker Actjurisdiction. In its attempt to withdraw the juris-
dictional loopholes created by Casman and other cases, the court in UNR proclaimed that "[a ] ll
jurisdictional rules are absolute." UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1022 (Fed.
Cir. 1992), aF'd sub nom. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993). The court entirely
overlooked the fact that, with the Supreme Court's blessing, federal courts routinely hear
claims outside their prescribed jurisdiction.
315. 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
316. See id. at 887.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 888.
319. See id. at 889.
320. 482 U.S. 64 (1987).
321. See id. (noting that Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all Tucker Act and
Little Tucker Act appeals).
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cal facts in order to permit two separate trial courts and two inde-
pendent appellate avenues to consider alternative theories of relief;
should not be imposed unless clearly required by statute."32 The court
concluded that traditionally, the law has disfavored multiple litiga-
tion.ss Finding that "U]ustice, as well as efficiency," were more likely
to be served by resolution of all issues in a single court, the Federal
Circuit upheld the jurisdiction of the district court over the claims
against OTS .
The holding of Far West, however, is fairly narrowsa2 The court ig-
nored a narrow "sue and be sued" clause in order to allow a govern-
ment corporation to be sued for money damages where a sister
agency was properly being sued for money damages in the same dis-
trict court. 26 The case does provide, however, a basis for an ex-
panded-although still limited-doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
For the first time, the Federal Circuit applied the rationales underly-
ing traditional pendent jurisdiction to a case raising issues of sover-
eign immunity, suggesting that the principles of judicial efficiency
promoted by pendent jurisdiction have as much or more weight than
the principle of sovereign immunity.3 27 As sovereign immunity is the
only principle that can explain the historical reluctance to relax the
jurisdictional rules of the Tucker Act and other statutes allowing suits
against the government,3 Far West suggests that it is time to rethink
the application of pendent jurisdiction in all types of suits against the
government.
Given the importance of sovereign immunity over the years,
though, pendent jurisdiction probably cannot be imported wholesale
into the government litigation arena, erasing all jurisdictional barri-
ers between courts. If it is to be accepted, the doctrine must be lim-
ited. The Supreme Court, in its landmark pendent jurisdiction case
322. Far West, 930 F.2d at 891 (emphasis added).
323. See id.
324. See id. at 892.
325. See Coast Fed. Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 785 F. Supp. 170, 174 (D.D.C.
1991) (declining to follow Far West because it did not discuss necessary cases nor was its deci-
sion explicit with regard to binding nature of agency's waiver); see also Wiliam J. Perlstein, Liti-
gating with the FDIC and RTC: Asset Based Claims Rights of Owners to Contest Actions Under FIRREA
147, 230 (PLI Comm. Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. 559, 1990) (recognizing that
Far West did not decide whether the agency's waiver bound the United States).
326. SeeFar West 930 F.2d at 889.
327. See id. at 892 (arguing that waivers of sovereign immunity should be viewed "in light of
the congressional abhorrence of unnecessary burdens upon courts and litigants").
328. See Stuart M. Gerson, Goodwill and Net Worth Maintenance Actions 287, 291 (PLI Comm.
Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. 588, 1991) (noting that government has argued un-
der doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Tucker Act that certain claims are the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Claims Court).
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United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,32 held that whether to exercise pendent
jurisdiction is within the discretion of the trial court, and urged trial
courts to decline jurisdiction where state law claims "substantially
predominate."" The firm application of this element of Gibbs could
make expanded pendentjurisdiction more palatable to courts under-
standably reluctant to abrogate congressional authority over the
scope of sovereign immunity.
Acting within the constraints of Gibbs, courts should decline juris-
diction over a suit against the federal government in any case in
which claims normally cognizable only in another forum substantially
predominate. Thus, for example, a district court should accept juris-
diction over a takings claim for more than $10,000 where that claim
is subsidiary to a related tort claim brought under the FTCA. But the
district court should decline jurisdiction where a plaintiff links a sub-
sidiary tort claim to a more predominant breach of contract claim
seeking more than $10,000. Similarly, the CFC should accept juris-
diction over an equitable claim that is subordinate to a breach of
contract claim, seeking money damages, but should decline jurisdic-
tion where the equitable claim predominates. Where either a district
court or the CFC declines jurisdiction, the court may transfer the
case to the proper forum under the transfer statute."'
The exercise of pendent jurisdiction in this way must be limited in
one important respect. Because the Tucker Act expressly precludes
the CFC from hearing tort claims, the CFC probably can never accept
pendentjurisdiction over an FTCA claim.32 This means not only that
a plaintiff cannot initially raise a tort claim in the CFC, but also that a
district court may not transfer a tort claim with a Tucker Act claim if
it finds the Tucker Act claim predominates. Until the Tucker Act is
amended, plaintiffs will not be able to join a subsidiary tort claim
with a predominant breach of contract or takings claim in a single
court.
By exercising discretion to hear a limited range of pendent claims,
courts can respect congressional authority to allocate jurisdiction
while also recognizing the practical dissolution of sovereign immu-
nity and giving citizens access to the same justice against their gov-
ernment that they have against each other.
329. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
330. Id. at 726.
331. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994).
332. See id.§ 1491(a)(1).
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CONCLUSION
Section 1500 is the flashpoint in many disputes regarding the locus
and nature of the claims a plaintiff may assert against the United
States because it provides the means for counteracting the lawyer's
natural impulse to cover all bases. But § 1500 is not the root of those
disputes. The essential problem is the antiquated system ofjurisdic-
tion in suits against the government.
Federal government litigation represents one of the last bastions of
19th Century pleading and practice. The Tucker Act makes the CFC
the only court outside the recalcitrant state courts in Virginia,3
Delaware," and NewJersey" to continue to honor the division of law
and equity and the modern litigant is hard-pressed to find another
jurisdictional grant that speaks of claims that "sound in tort," as the
Tucker Act does. m In the face of a century of movement towards
flexibility in pleading at all other levels of the judicial system, the
federal government has maintained and reinforced a system based
on archaic forms of action, in which a litigant who cannot style his in-
jury in the proper phraseology is barred from his remedy.
The adherence to narrow, formalistic jurisdictional rules in federal
government litigation creates much more mischief now than it did in
the past because of the rapid retreat of sovereign immunity. While
sovereign immunity retained its basic viability, the use of narrow ju-
risdictional grants helped restrain the type and number of suits the
government had to defend. Today sovereign immunity has been
stripped of its armor; the United States may be sued for breach of
contract, tort, constitutional violations, errors in carrying out its ex-
ecutive functions, and most other perceived harms to its citizens.
The narrow jurisdictional grants persist, however, creating a system
that penalizes some plaintiffs with valid claims while rewarding those
with the savvy to pursue all the available relief through creative plead-
ing.
A thorough overhaul of § 1500 seems unlikely; a thorough rework-
ing of the various statutes waiving sovereign immunity and allocating
jurisdiction over federal government litigation seems inconceivable.
333. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-270 (describing procedures for transferring cases between
equity and law sides of court); see also Vicars v. First National Bank Mountain Empire, 458
S.E.2d 293, 294 n.1 (Va. 1995) (noting that trial court transferred case to law side of court pur-
suant to plaintiff's motion requesting transfer).
334. See genera/ly Glanding v. Industrial Trust Co., 45 A.2d 553 (Del. 1945) (discussing his-
tory of separate equityjurisdiction in Delaware).
335. See N.J. RULE 4:3-1 (describing divisions of court system). See generally Lyn-Anna Prop-
erties, Ltd. v. Harborview Dev. Corp., 678 A.2d 683 (N.J. 1996) (explaining division of NewJer-
sey Superior Court system into Chancery Division, which is equity side, and Law Division).
336. 28U.S.C.§ 1491(a)(1).
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Assuming that Congress fails to address these issues, and that the cur-
rent trend toward a reduced reverence for sovereign immunity con-
tinues, it may become possible for courts to address some of the most
vexing jurisdictional problems-such as the Bowen-Casman di-
lemma-through the expansion of the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
tion.
The Federal Circuit's suggestion in Far West that in some cases the
principles of judicial efficiency and fairness underlying the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine may overcome the sanctity of sovereign immu-
nity makes possible a new approach to the many problems of federal
government litigation. Courts may ultimately feel free to alleviate the
arbitrariness created by the piecemeal waivers of sovereign immunity
and by § 1500 by allowing limited pendent jurisdiction under which
district courts may hear some claims currently assigned to the CFC
and the CFC may hear some claims currently assigned to the district
courts. Until then, unfortunately, uncertainty reigns, and litigants
against the federal government must simply await the next pro-
nouncement on the scope of § 1500, while choosing carefully the de-
nomination and locus of their claims.
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